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THE DRUG (PRICING) WARS: STATES, 
PREEMPTION, AND UNSUSTAINABLE PRICES* 
ISAAC D. BUCK** 
It is no secret: the prices of prescription drugs in the United States are 
unsustainable. As a piercing example of the limits of America’s incomplete and 
disordered health care nonsystem, the crisis has only worsened in recent years. 
Not only do drug prices exact a toll on America’s consumers, but they also 
impact Americans’ access to life-enhancing (and sometimes lifesaving) drugs. 
They constitute a real and present threat to the quality of health care in the 
United States in 2020 and beyond. 
Recognizing this harm, states are increasingly operating in this space, seeking 
diverse regulatory solutions to better protect their citizens—from gouging 
statutes, to transparency laws, to formulary rules. In 2020, states 
operationalize multiple roles when it comes to prescription drug prices, and 
states’ indispensability has highlighted the need to categorize and summarize 
these efforts and their roles. These roles include states that serve as mere 
payers; those that try to activate consumer tools; those that facilitate various 
marketplaces; those that oversee and review the prices and purchases that take 
place in their states; and, ultimately, those that seek to directly penalize and 
punish pharmaceutical companies who price their drugs at certain levels. 
Many states occupy multiple, complex, and overlapping roles simultaneously. 
This Article undertakes that necessary review, observing that increased state 
regulatory action reflects a rising trend of state primacy in health policy. But it 
also observes a key limitation for state-centric regulation: state action is too 
often hamstrung by preemptive blocks that prevent various state solutions from 
taking effect. From ERISA, to the Dormant Commerce Clause, to the 
Department of Health and Human Services’ waiver process, to federal patent 
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preemption, these federal sources of law serve as a cumulative preemptive cap 
on necessary state action. 
Besides the obvious harms, these regulatory clogs can be characterized as (1) 
functioning too often as antidemocratic, (2) weakening the regulatory 
structure, (3) injecting regulatory inconsistencies, and (4) lessening the chances 
of a satisfactory federal solution. Applying lessons from the environmental law 
context, this Article challenges the wisdom and legitimacy of these federal 
regulatory clogs in the midst of a pharmaceutical drug-cost crisis. In addition 
to identifying alternative pathways, this analysis suggests a reexamination of 
the various legal regimes that block state efforts in this area, all while millions 
of Americans currently face drug prices that they simply cannot afford. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I think it is a moral requirement to make money when you can . . . to sell the 
product for the highest price.1 
—Nirmal Mulye, President, Nostrum Pharmaceuticals 
In 2017, Americans spent $333 billion on retail prescription drugs, up 
from $236 billion in 2007.2 This amount, when expressed on a per capita 
basis, exceeds every other country on earth3 and is more than double that of 
the United Kingdom and other European peer countries. 4  The cost 
phenomenon is due to one main reason: Americans spend more on drugs 
because the prices are higher.5 That Americans’ insurance is less comparatively 
protective is an additional cause, which ensures that the burden of cost is more 
directly felt by American citizens.6 
In 2019, nearly one-fourth of people taking prescription drugs in the 
United States had a hard time affording the cost of prescription drugs,7 and 
one in three uninsured Americans could not afford their medications.8 Indeed, 
one-third of money donated using GoFundMe is raised for medical expenses,9 
 
 1. Wayne Drash, Report: Pharma Exec Says He Had ‘Moral Requirement’ To Raise Drug Price 
400%, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/11/health/drug-price-hike-moral-requirement-bn/index 
.html [https://perma.cc/GZV9-D4VJ] (last updated Sept. 12, 2018, 9:25 PM).  
 2. Alison Kodjak, Prescription Drug Costs Driven by Manufacturer Price Hikes, Not Innovation, 
NPR (Jan. 7, 2019, 5:04 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/01/07/682986630/ 
prescription-drug-costs-driven-by-manufacturer-price-hikes-not-innovation [https://perma.cc/5FRK-
7L6N]. 
 3. See Pharmaceutical Spending, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., 
https://data.oecd.org/healthres/pharmaceutical-spending.htm [https://perma.cc/ZJ7N-97QT] (choose 
“Total” and “US dollars/capita” from “Perspectives” dropdown and adjust “yearly” time range to 
2017). 
 4. See Dana O. Sarnak, David Squires & Shawn Bishop, Paying for Prescription Drugs Around the 
World: Why Is the U.S. an Outlier?, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Oct. 5, 2017), 
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2017/oct/paying-prescription-drugs-
around-world-why-us-outlier [https://perma.cc/BV5V-R6DG]. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See Poll: Nearly 1 in 4 Americans Taking Prescription Drugs Say It’s Difficult To Afford Their 
Medicines, Including Larger Shares Among Those with Health Issues, with Low Incomes and Nearing 
Medicare Age, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.kff.org/health-costs/press-
release/poll-nearly-1-in-4-americans-taking-prescription-drugs-say-its-difficult-to-afford-medicines-
including-larger-shares-with-low-incomes/ [https://perma.cc/4C6B-M337]. 
 8. See Fiza Pirani, One-Third of Uninsured Americans Can’t Afford Their Medications, Study Finds, 
ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.ajc.com/news/health-med-fit-science/one-third-
uninsured-americans-can-afford-their-medications-study-finds/hu2WKzr3en4wNMPhgZtY9L/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z2ES-2DGA]; see also ROBIN A. COHEN, PETER BOERSMA & ANJEL 
VAHRATIAN, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATS., STRATEGIES USED BY ADULTS AGED 18–64 TO 
REDUCE THEIR PRESCRIPTION DRUG COSTS, 2017, at 5 (2019), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/ 
data/data-briefs/db333-h.pdf [https://perma.cc/FM36-KNDN]. 
 9. Nathan Heller, The Hidden Cost of GoFundMe Health Care, NEW YORKER (June 24, 2019), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/07/01/the-perverse-logic-of-gofundme-health-care 
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with thousands using the popular site to seek donations to cover the costs of 
their prescriptions.10 Charities that assist patients in paying for their drug co-
pays constitute a $10 billion industry.11 
It is not an exaggeration to state that the costs of drugs in the United 
States have, in and of themselves, caused their own health care crisis.12 In 
2019, nearly thirty percent of Americans reported not taking a prescription 
drug as directed because of its cost.13 Higher co-pays cause adherence rates to 
drop precipitously, and where pharmaceutical companies have offered free 
medications, adherence has noticeably improved. 14 With nonadherence to 
prescription drugs causing 125,000 deaths in the United States every year,15 
the exorbitant costs of prescription drugs cause harm that is more than just 
hypothetical.16 
Indeed, the cause of the cost crisis is multifactorial: an increase in 
deductibles, a decrease in insurance benefits, and the rise of pharmacy benefit 
managers.17 On top of this, there has been no federal holistic legal solution to 
regulate the costs pharmaceutical drug companies can charge. And although 
there are proposals, no complete solution appears to be immediately 
 
[https://perma.cc/8EGZ-9A5N (dark archive)]. GoFundMe is an online platform that facilitates 
charitable giving. See About GoFundMe, GOFUNDME, https://www.gofundme.com/c/about-us 
[https://perma.cc/U2ND-HXSB]. 
 10. See Lydia Ramsey Pflanzer, People Are Raising Money for Routine Prescriptions with Sites Like 
GoFundMe, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 10, 2017, 4:21 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/crowdfunding-
for-prescription-medications-2017-4 [https://perma.cc/LXD6-VT4M]. 
 11. Sarah Karlin-Smith, Co-Pay Support Orgs Rank High Among Largest U.S. Charities, POLITICO 
(May 15, 2017, 12:00 PM), https://www.politico.com/tipsheets/prescription-pulse/2017/05/co-pay-
support-orgs-rank-high-among-largest-us-charities-220316 [https://perma.cc/FT2M-ERGP]. 
 12. See, e.g., Kari Paul, Texas Woman Dies Because $116 Co-Pay for Flu Medication Was Too 
Expensive, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 12, 2018, 7:21 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/texas-
woman-dies-after-refusing-to-spend-116-co-pay-for-flu-medication-2018-02-12 [https://perma.cc/ 
9A96-8834] (telling the story of a woman who died after deciding not to pay for her medication and 
explaining that taking medicine incorrectly leads to 125,000 deaths per year). 
 13. See Jay Hancock, Americans Ready To Crack Down on Drug Prices That Force Some To Skip 
Doses, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Mar. 1, 2019), https://khn.org/news/americans-ready-to-crack-down-
on-drug-prices-that-force-some-to-skip-doses/ [https://perma.cc/2CJL-LF54]; see also Sarnak et al., 
supra note 4 (describing a similar statistic from previous years). 
 14. See Jane E. Brody, The Cost of Not Taking Your Medicine, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/17/well/the-cost-of-not-taking-your-medicine.html [https://perma 
.cc/M8GA-ADUZ (dark archive)]. 
 15. Id. 
 16. A 2019 Gallup poll found thirteen percent of those surveyed—or around thirty-four million 
American adults—“report[ed] knowing of at least one friend or family member in the past five years 
who died after not receiving needed medical treatment because they were unable to pay for it.” Dan 
Witters, Millions in U.S. Lost Someone Who Couldn’t Afford Treatment, GALLUP (Nov. 12, 2019), 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/268094/millions-lost-someone-couldn-afford-treatment.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/EKH7-D33B]. 
 17. See Lisa L. Gill, The Shocking Rise of Prescription Drug Prices, CONSUMER REPS. (Nov. 26, 
2019), https://www.consumerreports.org/drug-prices/the-shocking-rise-of-prescription-drug-prices/ 
[https://perma.cc/C4GQ-2UU7]. 
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forthcoming.18 Instead of a legislative solution emanating from the United 
States Capitol, individual states are intent on taking the lead to solve the 
prescription-drug-cost crisis. Various pressures push states into occupying this 
role, and the federal government’s inability to solve the problem has created a 
vacuum into which states have quickly stepped. 
But state regulation in the space has proven tricky. States’ attempts at 
regulation have been rebuffed by federal sources of power, yet the federal 
government offers no alternative solution to the prescription-drug-pricing 
crisis. These federal blocks have exacerbated the governance challenge that 
states with growing health care budgets are facing. They have also raised 
interesting questions about regulatory legitimacy and the appropriate limits of 
state power. 
This Article delves into those state efforts by providing a nomenclature 
for state action in this space. It documents the primary federal blocks, or 
regulatory clogs, on state power that constitute cumulative preemption and 
have debilitated state efforts. One need only consult regulatory arguments—
and particularly those concerns raised in environmental law scholarship—to 
note the potential damage done to the governing regime by a powerful but 
immobile federal government. 
The substantial federal preemption of state efforts puts at risk the 
strength, consistency, legitimacy, and prospects for success for improving the 
regulatory structure that would inure following robust and creative state 
regulation. And besides just hampering state efforts, these federal blocks 
prevent any durable state solutions from taking hold, aggravating the 
prescription-drug-cost crisis for states and their citizens alike. This Article 
identifies those threats and their consequences and seeks to unearth a way 
forward. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a holistic catalog and 
nomenclature of state efforts. Part II identifies regulatory clogs. And Part III, 
after consulting environmental law scholarship, summarizes the problems that 
are caused by the regulatory clogs. Before concluding, the Article also 
provides a brief analysis of alternative pathways for regulation that are not yet 
clogged or impeded. Ultimately, this effort is undertaken with a mindful eye 
toward reducing the costs that Americans are forced to pay for life-sustaining 
and lifesaving prescription drugs. 
 
 18. See infra notes 57–69 and accompanying text. 
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I.  STATE PRIMACY IN PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICING 
In 2020, it is clear that states are the dominant actors in American health 
care. They serve as payers for health care services for their citizenry19 and 
their most vulnerable citizens by determining the size and scope of their 
Medicaid programs.20 They serve as organizers, constructing marketplaces for 
private activity21 and determining the shape and focus of private insurance 
markets.22 They act as sellers, selling insurance within the market—the very 
markets that they themselves have constructed. 23  And they act as 
participants—they serve as major employers who must pay for and provide 
health insurance for their employees.24 
States do not just affect the conditions for health care delivery, they also 
exert regulatory power over the practice of medicine. They police the quality 
of care of providers practicing within their borders.25 They regulate, serving as 
 
 19. See Total Medicaid Spending, KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://www.kff.org/medicaid/state-
indicator/total-medicaid-spending [https://perma.cc/4KB9-GSSA] (showing the total Medicaid 
spending in fiscal year 2018 for the fifty states and the District of Columbia). 
 20. See Lola Fadulu, Why States Want Certain Americans To Work for Medicaid, ATLANTIC (Apr. 
12, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2019/04/medicaid-work-requirements-seema-
verma-cms/587026/ [https://perma.cc/VR5M-JMZS (dark archive)]; Status of State Action on the 
Medicaid Expansion Decision, KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://www.kff.org/health-reform/state-
indicator/state-activity-around-expanding-medicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act/ [https://perma.cc/ 
L7QS-ZT99] (showing that thirty-eight states, plus the District of Columbia, have chosen to expand 
Medicaid with a variety of tweaks and twists, while twelve have not chosen to expand Medicaid at 
all). 
 21. See, e.g., Louise Norris, Colorado Health Insurance Marketplace: History and News of the State’s 
Exchange, HEALTHINSURANCE.ORG (Aug. 12, 2020), https://www.healthinsurance.org/colorado-
state-health-insurance-exchange/ [https://perma.cc/4R9S-YMN5] (documenting characteristics of 
Colorado’s health insurance exchange marketplace). 
 22. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Joshua Sharfstein, Topher Spiro & Meghan O’Toole, State Options 
To Control Health Care Costs and Improve Quality, HEALTH AFFS.: HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (Apr. 
28, 2016), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20160428.054672/full/ [https://perma.cc/ 
5RFX-UKNZ]. 
 23. See, e.g., Health CO-OP, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS, https://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/ 
topic_health_co-op.htm [https://perma.cc/JQ9U-473Q] (last updated Feb. 12, 2020) (noting that one 
factor impacting the success of health insurance cooperatives is that they operate in a competitive 
marketplace). 
 24. See Health Insurance, PBS: HEALTHCARE CRISIS: WHO’S AT RISK?, 
https://www.pbs.org/healthcarecrisis/healthinsurance.html [https://perma.cc/GCD3-LEQB] (noting 
that the government as an employer provides coverage to 39.2 million people who work for federal, 
state, and local governments and the military). 
 25. See Drew Carlson & James N. Thompson, The Role of State Medical Boards, 7 AMA J. 
ETHICS: POL’Y F., 311, 311–13 (2005); see, e.g., The Mission of the Medical Board of California, MED. 
BD. CAL., http://www.mbc.ca.gov [https://perma.cc/4W7L-J5MZ] (“The mission of the Medical 
Board of California is to protect health care consumers through the proper licensing and regulation of 
physicians and surgeons and certain allied health care professionals and through the vigorous, 
objective enforcement of the Medical Practice Act, and to promote access to quality medical care 
through the Board’s licensing and regulatory functions.”). 
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the primary entity to approve hospital additions 26  under state-issued 
certificate laws. And they are law enforcers—their prosecutors enforce their 
health care fraud laws, seeking to prevent fraud and abuse of their taxpayers.27 
In short, states operate on all sides of health care transactions. 
While the future of the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”)28 remains tenuous, 
states continue to take a leading role in its operation.29 Under the ACA, many 
states have undertaken additional oversight of health care markets.30 In the 
wake of federal destruction, some are seeking to rebuild, or have rebuilt,31 
 
 26. See, e.g., Certificate of Need (CON), GA. DEP’T CMTY. HEALTH, 
https://dch.georgia.gov/certificate-need-con [https://perma.cc/2KAA-A2LG] (“Georgia began 
reviewing health care projects in 1975 . . . .”); Duke Files Certificate of Need for Hospital Expansion, 
DUKE HEALTH, https://corporate.dukehealth.org/news-listing/duke-files-certificate-need-hospital-
expansion [https://perma.cc/4YSY-FUMT] (Jan. 20, 2016) (“We fully recognize that this [expansion] 
project is conditional upon the approval by the state . . . .”); Submit a CON Application, MICH. DEP’T 
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.michigan.gov/mdhhs/0,5885,7-339-71551_2945_5106-
120981--,00.html [https://perma.cc/NS5V-FWJN] (explaining Michigan’s application process for a 
certificate of need). 
 27. See, e.g., False Claims Act, ch. 367, 2001 Tenn. Pub. Acts 850 (codified at TENN. CODE. 
ANN. §§ 4–18–101 to –108 (LEXIS through 2020 Reg. 2d Extraordinary Sesss.)); False Claims Act, 
ch. 1, §§ 1-605 to 1-618, 108A-63.1, 108A-63, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 1518 (codified as amended at 
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-605 to 1-618, 108A-63.1, 108A-63 (2013) (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 
2020-97 of the 2020 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.)). According to U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services’ reviews in 2019, twenty-one states currently have False Claims Act statutes. See 
State False Claims Act Reviews, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. OFF. INSPECTOR 
GEN., https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/state-false-claims-act-reviews/ [https://perma.cc/FXY7-Y375 (staff-
uploaded archive)]. 
 28. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C. titles 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42). 
 29. Plaintiffs, intent on destroying the ACA, are now on to another creative argument in Texas 
v. United States, 945 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted sub nom. Texas v. California, 140 S. Ct. 
1262 (Mar. 2, 2020) (mem.), literally pitting the states against the federal government (and, in fact, 
some states against other states). Id. at 375–76. In this litigation, states are arguing that congressional 
power is so limited under the commerce power that invalidating the tax penalty under the ACA 
knocked out its only constitutional basis, see id. at 390, an argument that has been met with a healthy 
dose of legal skepticism. See Nicholas Bagley, Rise of the Know-Nothing Judge, ATLANTIC 
(July 15, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/07/texas-v-us-rise-know-nothing-
judge/593959/ [https://perma.cc/LW89-A4HQ (dark archive)]. After a Fifth Circuit decision that 
would have struck down the ACA, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in March of 2020. 
Texas v. California, 140 S. Ct. 1262, 1262 (Mar. 2, 2020) (mem.). 
 30. See The Marketplace in Your State, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/ 
marketplace-in-your-state/ [https://perma.cc/ZSE7-BBH8] (noting that some states have expanded 
their programs and listing states that maintain their own websites). 
 31. See John Myers, California Gov. Gavin Newsom Has Signed His First Budget. Here’s Where the 
$215  Billion  Will  Go,  L.A.  TIMES  (June  27,  2019,  5:27 PM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/ 
la-pol-ca-california-government-spending-budget-20190627-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/62X9-
QUER] (“Beginning Jan. 1, Californians will be required to have at least ‘minimal essential coverage’ 
for healthcare needs or face a cash penalty — a state version of the individual mandate that was 
abandoned by federal lawmakers.”). 
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parts of the law. 32  In addition to providing structural oversight, others 
participate in the health care marketplace, overseeing nonprofit cooperatives 
that compete with private insurance plans to provide health insurance for yet 
more of their citizens.33 And in the face of federal failure, states are operating 
with increasing frequency to bring down the prices of prescription drugs.34 
A. Causes of State Ubiquity 
Ten years into the ACA, states exert control over setting health policy.35 
They have explored new prescriptions—with great heterogeneity—for drug 
policy.36 States’ potent power to affect, and their resulting interest in, the cost 
of prescription drugs is due to three contemporary causes: (1) their budgets, 
(2) the courts, and (3) congressional inaction. 
Budgets. America accounts for one of every twenty-five people on Earth 
but fifty percent of worldwide expenditures on prescription drugs.37 Medicaid, 
the federal-state cooperative program that covers seventy-five million 
Americans,38 accounts for nearly twenty percent of all states’ general funds.39 
These budgets, which are required to be balanced at the state level,40 are 
 
 32. See Bob Salsberg, ACA Mandate Gone, but a Few States Still Require Coverage, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/0f53160eb52a4a3991a9b758f7a8dda8 [https:// 
perma.cc/97CZ-H7EZ] (noting that New Jersey and the District of Columbia “enacted laws replacing 
the federal mandate” and that Vermont’s mandate is set to go into effect in 2020). 
 33. See NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS, supra note 23. 
 34. See Steven Findlay, States Pass Record Number of Laws To Reel in Drug Prices, KAISER 
HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 9, 2019), https://khn.org/news/states-pass-record-number-of-laws-to-reel-in-
drug-prices/ [https://perma.cc/K7G7-43HD]. 
 35. Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, What Is Federalism in Healthcare For?, 70 STAN. L. 
REV. 1689, 1785 (2018) (“The ACA did offer states policy control—power that was enhanced by the 
ability to leverage the possibility of opting out to extract concessions from the federal government.”). 
 36. See Sarah Lanford, What States Did in 2019 To Address Health Coverage and Costs, NAT’L 
ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POL’Y (Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.nashp.org/what-states-did-in-2019-
to-address-health-coverage-and-costs [https://perma.cc/4SEW-C7FM] (“[S]tates continued to take 
steps to rein in drug costs, from passing legislation to create wholesale drug importation programs to 
regulating pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) more aggressively.”). 
 37. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Democrats Are Having the Wrong Health Care Debate, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/02/opinion/democrats-health-care.html?action= 
click&module=Opinion&pgtype=Homepage [https://perma.cc/G2J6-Z4MP (dark archive)]. 
 38. See Medicaid Expansion Enrollment, KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://www.kff.org/health-
reform/state-indicator/medicaid-expansion-enrollment/ [https://perma.cc/GS7V-ND7D]. 
 39. See Medicaid’s Share of State Budgets, MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS 
COMM’N,    https://www.macpac.gov/subtopic/medicaids-share-of-state-budgets/ [https://perma.cc/ 
H77N-ALJU]. 
 40. See Michelle Andrews, States Join Fight To Lower Prescription Prices, AARP: POL. & SOC’Y 
(Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.aarp.org/politics-society/advocacy/info-2019/states-fight-prescription-
drug-prices.html [https://perma.cc/6YK4-H4W8]; Katherine Young, Utilization and Spending Trends 
in Medicaid Outpatient Prescription Drugs, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Feb. 15, 2019), 
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/utilization-and-spending-trends-in-medicaid-outpatient-
prescription-drugs/ [https://perma.cc/Y65S-GGBX] (“Because states must balance their budgets, 
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increasingly strained by the price of prescription drugs.41 And money spent on 
health care is money that cannot be spent on other societal goods, like 
education.42 
For example, Massachusetts’ Medicaid program, MassHealth, has 
experienced a near-doubling of its prescription drug budget in recent years, 
from $1.1 billion in 2012 to $1.9 billion in 2017.43 In 2018, that number was 
reportedly $2.2 billion.44 The causes are identifiable. For example, about two 
dozen drugs in California make up almost half of the state’s prescription drug 
budget.45 It is true that net spending on prescription drugs in the Medicaid 
program has slowed in recent years, but gross spending continues to 
increase.46 For some, the pricing challenge is being framed as a patient safety 
issue, especially where expensive drugs impact patient treatment compliance.47 
 
ongoing increased spending on Medicaid prescription drugs is a policy concern, prompting states to 
consider ways to reduce drug spending.”). 
 41. See Martha Bebinger, Medicaid Drug Spending: A Power Struggle Between States, Federal 
Government, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 21, 2018, 11:08 AM), https://www.usnews.com/ 
news/healthcare-of-tomorrow/articles/2018-09-21/medicaid-drug-spending-a-power-struggle-between 
-states-federal-government [https://perma.cc/RF86-9KPB] (“Drugs are among the fastest-rising 
health care costs for many consumers and are a key reason health care spending dominates many state 
budgets — crowding out roads, schools and other priorities.”); Alisa Chester & Ian Reynolds, States 
Work To Curb Drug Spending: Tight Budgets Lead to New Approaches to Managing Costs, GEO. UNIV. 
HEALTH POL’Y INST.: CTR. FOR CHILD. & FAMS. (Feb. 23, 2018), 
https://ccf.georgetown.edu/2018/02/23/states-work-to-curb-drug-spending-tight-budgets-lead-to-new 
-approaches-to-managing-costs/ [https://perma.cc/ZKX7-MUKQ] (“These rising costs have strained 
state budgets, leading policymakers to look for strategies—within Medicaid and beyond—to better 
manage spending while ensuring a patient’s access to needed medications.”); Shefali Luthra & Phil 
Galewitz, In Florida, Drug Importation from Canada Finds New Champions, Old Snags, KAISER HEALTH 
NEWS (Feb. 25, 2019), https://khn.org/news/in-florida-drug-re-importation-from-canada-finds-new-
champions-old-snags/ [https://perma.cc/N75G-9PJH] (mentioning that some state “budgets are 
directly squeezed by climbing drug prices”). 
 42. See Gabrielle Levy, Increases in Medicaid Spending Come at the Expense of Higher Education: 
Study, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (May 1, 2018, 4:37 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/national-
news/articles/2018-05-01/increases-in-medicaid-spending-come-at-the-expense-of-higher-education-
study [https://perma.cc/XD9N-BMKW]. 
 43. See Jessica Bartlett, State Report: Drug Benefit Managers Are Driving up Health Care Costs, 
BOS. BUS. J. (June 5, 2019, 12:50 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/boston/news/2019/06/05/state-
reportsays-drug-benefit-managers-are-driving.html [https://perma.cc/7LRV-DFAR]. 
 44. See Robert Pear, Massachusetts, a Health Pioneer, Turns Its Focus to Drug Prices. It’s in for a 
Fight., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/31/us/politics/massachusetts-
drug-costs-medicaid-waiver.html [https://perma.cc/B2V3-B8XA (dark archive)]. 
 45. See Merrill Goozner, California’s Path To Lower Drug Prices, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Jan. 8, 
2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20190108/BLOG/190109919/california-
s-path-to-lower-drug-prices [https://perma.cc/9U7R-JK3X (dark archive)]. 
 46. See MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N, MEDICAID DRUG SPENDING 
TRENDS 1 (2019), https://www.macpac.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Medicaid-Drug-Spending-
Trends.pdf [https://perma.cc/MN6Y-TV63]. 
 47. See Wilson Ring, States Look To Lower Drug Costs, Consider Canadian Imports, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Feb. 11, 2018), https://apnews.com/84ca06724c4641689b367e2f4a9e1325/States-look-to-
lower-drug-costs,-consider-Canadian-imports [https://perma.cc/9Z8U-KFSB] (“‘The No. 1 threat to 
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Courts. Second, where harshening budgetary realities have forced states 
to pay more attention to the cost of health care for their citizens, newly 
understood Commerce Clause jurisprudence48 has given states the ability to 
operate with more discretion and impunity in this area. In its biggest moment 
in 2012, a 5–4 Supreme Court vote invalidated the ACA’s individual mandate 
under the Commerce Clause49 but upheld the mandate under the tax and 
spending authority.50 And, after the individual mandate penalty was zeroed 
out by Congress in late 2017,51 the Fifth Circuit upheld a finding that the 
mandate penalty was unconstitutional in late 2019 before the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari.52 
But in the same 2012 decision, the Supreme Court invalidated the 
mandatory nature of Medicaid expansion under the ACA by a 7–2 vote, 
holding that the expansion was unconstitutionally coercive on the states.53 
Overall, the opinion illustrated both the Court’s new unfriendliness toward 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence54 and a departure from Medicaid’s history.55 
Both decisions hemmed in federal power, aggressively carving back Congress’ 
right to legislate under the Commerce Clause. 56  States naturally felt 
empowered to step into the breach. 
 
patient safety related to prescription drugs in our state is that the drugs are so expensive that people 
don’t take them,’ [Utah State Rep. Norm] Thurston said.”). 
 48. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 582 (2012) (“The threatened loss of 
over 10 percent of a State’s overall budget, in contrast, is economic dragooning that leaves the States 
with no real option but to acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion.”). 
 49. Id. at 552–58. 
 50. Id. at 562–74. 
 51. See Robert Pear, Without the Insurance Mandate, Health Care’s Future May Be in Doubt, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/18/us/politics/tax-cut-obamacare-
individual-mandate-repeal.html [https://perma.cc/TQ9Y-BD7G (dark archive)]. 
 52. See Abby Goodnough, Obamacare Insurance Mandate Is Struck Down by Federal Appeals Court, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/18/health/obamacare-mandate.html 
[https://perma.cc/34FG-HQAU (dark archive)] (last updated June 26, 2020); see also Texas v. United 
States, 945 F.3d 355, 369 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted sub nom. Texas v. California, 140 S. Ct. 1262 
(Mar. 2, 2020) (mem.); Texas v. California, 140 S. Ct. 1262, 1262 (Mar. 2, 2020) (mem.) (granting 
certiorari). 
 53. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 579–85. 
 54. See Jonathan L. Marshfield, The Amendment Effect, 98 B.U. L. REV. 55, 69 (2018) (arguing 
that Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion “was a strategic choice aimed at effectuating broader doctrinal 
change in the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence”). 
 55. See Nicole Huberfeld, The Universality of Medicaid at Fifty, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & 
ETHICS 67, 72 (2015) (“Over time, Congress expanded Medicaid eligibility by requiring states to 
provide comprehensive medical coverage to children under age twenty-one; to expand coverage of 
the aged, blind, and disabled; to expand eligibility standards for pregnant women and for children; 
and to financially support drug coverage for people enrolled in both Medicare and Medicaid after the 
Medicare drug benefit was enacted.”). 
 56. And it has not only been the Sebelius decision—other administrative-based policy solutions 
have been blocked by federal courts. A Trump administration plan—requiring all pharmaceutical 
companies to publicize their list prices in every television advertisement—was blocked from 
implementation by a federal court in 2019. Merck v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 385 F. 
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Congress. Finally, while no clear administrative solutions have been 
forthcoming,57 perhaps it is Congress that has provided salient impetus for 
state action in the pharmaceutical drug space. While Congress publicizes 
public outrage over the cost of prescription drugs,58 it has not passed any 
serious regulatory solution over the last decade.59 Even though legislative 
solutions have been proposed,60 beyond salvos, Congress has, to date, failed to 
address the root cause of the pharmaceutical cost crisis.61 It has been stymied 
by infighting.62 
 
Supp. 3d 81, 89–90 (D.D.C. 2019); see also Katie Thomas & Katie Rogers, Judge Blocks Trump Rule 
Requiring Drug Companies To List Prices in TV Ads, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/08/health/drug-prices-tv-ads-trump.html [https://perma.cc/KR7D 
-CTXZ (dark archive)]. As was the case in another prominent federal court decision that struck down 
a state-led antigouging effort, the court recognized the challenge of prescription drug pricing, before 
unceremoniously destroying the administration’s attempt to shame drug companies. Merck, 385 F. 
Supp. 3d at 84 (noting that the court did not “take any view on the wisdom of requiring drug 
companies to disclose prices,” and that the proposal “could be an effective tool in halting the rising 
cost of prescription drugs”). Even the judges striking down these proposed fixes attempt to distance 
themselves from the very impacts of their rulings. See id. (“[N]o matter how vexing the problem of 
spiraling drug costs may be, [the Department of Health and Human Services] cannot do more than 
what Congress has authorized. The responsibility rests with Congress to act in the first instance.”). 
 57. See Emanuel, supra note 37. 
 58. See Halimah Abdullah, ‘Pharma Bro’ Shkreli Invokes the Fifth Before Congress, NBC NEWS, 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/pharma-bro-martin-shkreli-faces-congress-n511106 
[https://perma.cc/ML4E-8UC5 (staff-uploaded archive)] (Feb. 4, 2016, 7:33 PM) (“[Rep. Elijah] 
Cummings [D-Md.] angrily yelled him [sic], ‘It’s not funny, Mr. Shkreli. People are dying. And 
they’re getting sicker and sick[er].”); Dylan Scott, Congress Is Grilling Pharma CEOs. Here Are 8 Ideas 
for Bringing Down Drug Prices., VOX, https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/1/14 
/18176707/congress-drug-prices-hearing-pharmaceutical-ceos [https://perma.cc/JP7B-W8PL (staff-
uploaded archive)] (last updated Feb. 26, 2019, 10:30 AM); Martin Shkreli Takes the 5th in Front of 
‘Imbeciles’ on Congressional Committee, Infuriating Lawmakers, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 4, 2016, 3:33 PM), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-martin-shkreli-congressional-hearing-20160204-
story.html [https://perma.cc/V4HA-QHSP]; Kelefa Sanneh, Everyone Hates Martin Shkreli. Everyone 
Is Missing the Point, NEW YORKER (Feb. 5, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-
comment/everyone-hates-martin-shkreli-everyone-is-missing-the-point [https://perma.cc/HRF6-
XZX9 (dark archive)]. 
 59. See Jay Hancock, Everyone Wants To Reduce Drug Prices. So Why Can’t We Do It?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/23/sunday-review/prescription-drugs-
prices.html [https://perma.cc/HW7X-MB2S (dark archive)] (“Even powerful members of Congress 
from both parties have said that drug prices are too high. But any momentum to curtail prescription 
drug costs — a problem that a large number of Americans now believe government should solve — 
has been lost amid rancorous debates over replacing Obamacare and stalled amid roadblocks erected 
via lobbying and industry cash.”). 
 60. See Prescription Drug Pricing Reduction Act, S. 2543, 116th Cong. (2019) (proposing 
legislation to “lower prescription drug prices” and “improve transparency” related to pharmaceutical 
practices); Elijah E. Cummings Lower Drug Costs Now Act, H.R. 3, 116th Cong. (2019) (proposing 
legislation “[t]o establish a fair price negotiation program”). 
 61. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, McConnell Promised To End Senate Gridlock. Instead, Republicans Are 
Stuck in Neutral., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/03/us/politics 
/senate-votes-mcconnell.html [https://perma.cc/2NFJ-D65F (dark archive)] (“Seven months into a 
new era of divided government, the Republican-led Senate limped out of Washington this week after 
the fewest legislative debates of any in recent memory, without floor votes on issues that both parties 
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Inaction by Congress in this space is nothing new.63 Proposed solutions 
to the prescription-pricing crisis are fraught with political risk,64 industry 
attention, lobbying efforts,65 and unavoidable complexity.66 Unsurprisingly, 
coming up with a solution to address the cost of prescription drugs remains 
divisive in Congress. 67 And, as recent efforts have floundered, 68 no clear 
regulatory solutions are imminently forthcoming.69 
 
view as urgent: the high cost of prescription drugs, a broken immigration system and crumbling 
infrastructure.”). 
 62. See Adam Cancryn, Liberals Fight Their Own Party over Drug Prices, 
POLITICO,  https://www.politico.com/story/2019/06/06/democrats-prescription-drug-prices-1497676 
[http://perma.cc/U2RY-VDDR] (June 6, 2019, 10:36 AM); Emmarie Huetteman, GOP Senators 
Distance Themselves from Grassley and Trump’s Efforts To Cut Drug Prices, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (July 
25, 2019), https://khn.org/news/gop-senators-distance-themselves-from-grassley-and-trumps-efforts-
to-cut-drug-prices/ [https://perma.cc/JTA9-HCVM]; Alex Pareene, Do Democrats Actually Want To 
Make Drugs Cheaper?, NEW REPUBLIC (June 3, 2019), https://newrepublic.com/article/154038 
/democrats-actually-want-make-drugs-cheaper [https://perma.cc/9TVX-J2L9 (dark archive)]. 
 63. This is perhaps best illustrated by the cancellation of a 2016 proposed pilot that would have 
changed the way that Medicare Part B paid participating doctors for (often very expensive) drugs 
that are administered in-office. For a full explanation of the proposal, see Isaac D. Buck, The Cost of 
High Prices: Embedding an Ethic of Expense into the Standard of Care, 58 B.C. L. REV. 101, 130–34 
(2017). This plan, which would have constituted a relatively minor regulatory step, was abruptly 
abandoned by the Obama administration—after criticism from both sides of the political aisle—in 
late 2016. See Zachary Brennan, CMS Drops Medicare Part B Drug Payment Pilot, REGUL. FOCUS 
(Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.raps.org/regulatory-focus™/news-articles/2016/12/cms-drops-medicare-
part-b-drug-payment-pilot [https://perma.cc/7S9D-PU5C]; Rachel Dolan, The Demise of the Part B 
Demo: Doom for Value-Based Payment?, HEALTH AFFS.: HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (Dec. 27, 2016), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20161227.058082/full/ [http://perma.cc/6QJ9-FUUD 
(staff-uploaded archive)]; Ryan Grim & Jeffrey Young, House Democrats Push Back on Obama Plan To 
Cut Drug Prices, HUFFPOST, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/house-democrats-hhs-drug-prices 
_n_5720e639e4b0b49df6a9c93f [http://perma.cc/2ACY-FY7G] (Apr. 28, 2016). The proposal would 
have changed the reimbursement mechanism by beginning to move away from directly linking the 
doctor’s profit to the overall cost of a drug—in an effort to remove the strong financial incentive that 
exists for physicians to prescribe more expensive drugs for their Medicare Part B patients. See Rachel 
E. Sachs, Delinking Reimbursement, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2307, 2308–14 (2018) [hereinafter Sachs, 
Delinking Reimbursement] (highlighting the importance in delinking the financial and reimbursement 
structure from the FDA-approval structure). The pilot was dropped after access concerns for 
Medicare beneficiaries were raised. See Brennan, supra. 
 64. See, e.g., Katie Thomas & Reed Abelson, How Trump’s Latest Plan To Cut Drug Prices Will 
Affect You, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/05/health/drug-prices-
rebates-sotu.html [https://perma.cc/MS9F-5W9U (dark archive)] (noting that a new proposed 
Trump administration rule will have “tricky” politics). 
 65. See Susan Scutti, Big Pharma Spends Record Millions on Lobbying Amid Pressure 
To  Lower  Drug  Prices, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/23/health/phrma-lobbying-costs-bn 
/index.html [https://perma.cc/NS68-3QFY] (last updated Jan. 24, 2019, 2:38 PM) (noting that the 
pharmaceutical industry lobbying was more than $27 million in 2018). 
 66. See Austin Frakt, There Is No Single, Best Policy for Drug Prices, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/15/upshot/lower-drug-prices-no-one-cure.html 
[https://perma.cc/R72H-3PRB (dark archive)] (“Although there appears to be a mandate to lower 
drug prices, it’s an issue that defies a simple solution.”). 
 67. See Li Zhou, House Democrats’ Internal Feud Over Prescription Drug Prices, Explained, VOX 
(June 17, 2019, 8:20 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/6/17/18650959/nancy-
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B. State Efforts To Secure Access to Prescription Drugs 
In health policy and regulation, a state’s various roles are ubiquitous and 
multilayered. In one role, the state may be principally focused on paying for 
health care services and securing access for its indigent population, for 
example, 70  while in another, it may seek to ensure the enforcement of 
licensing and quality standards, which can have negative impacts on access.71 
In the prescription drug context, states may want to both guarantee patient 
access to expensive drugs and limit budgetary increases. These conflicts 
require states to achieve adequate balance between access and quality, free 
markets and government regulation, and private ingenuity and public options. 
The differences in policy can be drastic. A policy that cuts back on the 
scope or breadth of Medicaid coverage will effectively reduce the state’s 
financial burden for pharmaceutical prices.72 This, in turn, would undoubtedly 
save the state money but could harm individual patients’ finances if the policy 
increases cost sharing for its citizens. Similarly, an overbroad state policy that 
limits the types of drugs that can be sold in the state may save the state 
taxpayer dollars but may negatively impact citizens’ health.73 
States have an incentive to slow the increased financial impact on state 
budgets but may lack the same intense incentive to lower the list price of 
pharmaceutical drugs themselves. For example, in an effort to address a state’s 
budgetary crisis caused by the price of pharmaceutical drugs, a state may seek 
to stop covering the drug in its Medicaid program. This may help alleviate the 
 
pelosi-prescription-drug-prices-lloyd-doggett [https://perma.cc/E5M3-YJYW (staff-uploaded 
archive)] (“Reducing prescription drug prices was a key plank of House Democrats’ platform during 
the 2018 midterms. More than six months into their term, however, a concrete bill has yet to emerge 
from House leadership on the subject . . . .”). 
 68. See Jessie Hellmann, White House Says Pelosi Plan To Lower Drug Prices ‘Unworkable’, HILL 
(Nov. 8, 2019, 12:10 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/469608-white-house-calls-pelosis-
plan-to-lower-drug-prices-unworkable-and-hyper [https://perma.cc/426Q-GL4G (staff-uploaded 
archive)]. 
 69. See Caitlin Owens, Congress Lukewarm on Helping Biosimilars, AXIOS (June 12, 2019), 
https://www.axios.com/congress-lukewarm-on-helping-biosimilars-c5ced9a1-7b27-4ec3-897a-
103c73f36c7b.html [https://perma.cc/B7A8-S9V9]. 
 70. See Ashley Lopez, Most Texans Want State To Expand Medicaid and Help Poor Get Health 
Care, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (June 14, 2018), https://khn.org/news/most-texans-want-state-to-
expand-medicaid-and-help-poor-get-health-care/ [https://perma.cc/G44G-KWV8]. 
 71. See, e.g., In re Guess, 327 N.C. 46, 48–54, 393 S.E.2d 833, 834–38 (1990) (evaluating 
licensing laws in the context of a licensed doctor practicing alternative medical therapies). 
 72. See, e.g., Matthew Fleming & Phil Galewitz, 13 States Cut Medicaid To Balance Budgets, 
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (July 24, 2012), https://khn.org/news/medicaid-cuts/ [https://perma.cc/ 
MHL6-4FR4] (“Thirteen states are moving to cut Medicaid by reducing benefits, paying health 
providers less or tightening eligibility, even as the federal government prepares to expand the 
insurance program for the poor to as many as 17 million more people.”). 
 73. See, e.g., Phil Galewitz, States Cut Medicaid Drug Benefits To Save Money, KAISER HEALTH 
NEWS (July 24, 2012), https://khn.org/news/medicaid-cuts-sidebar/ [https://perma.cc/KDS9-9JJG]. 
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state budgetary burden but would have a limited impact in addressing the 
overall burden of drug prices for all Americans.74 
In an effort to provide a working nomenclature for the flurry of activity 
at the state level, the state’s five primary roles—(1) payer, (2) consumer, (3) 
market facilitator, (4) overseer, and (5) regulator—are presented immediately 
below. These roles differ on the score of whether they can impact prescription 
drug prices—from the ambivalence of the payer to the hard power of the law 
brought to bear by the regulator—and, indeed, whether the state efforts are 
legally defensible. 
1.  State as Payer 
First, and most prominently, states can operate as passive funders of 
health care services and products. In this role, states can simply—and often 
only—provide public funding for health care services and delivery for their 
citizens.75 This role is characterized by passivity—not in that the state takes no 
action in the delivery of health care but that the state is largely ambivalent as 
to the prices of prescription drugs because they are required to cover them 
through their Medicaid programs.76 Seemingly unconcerned with, or unable to 
achieve, global cost cutting or cost control, here the state is predominantly 
focused on the goal of securing and protecting access to health care for its 
citizens. To ensure this access, the state pays for health care products but may 
exercise little discretion in determining the types or costs of those products. 
In its most dramatic—and likely common—iteration, decisions that impact 
cost effectiveness are often left up to the whim of the patient or provider, and 
the state merely foots the bill.77 
The state undertakes a number of actions in the spirit of its funder role. 
In addition to the state providing tax credits to pharmaceutical companies for 
research and development78 and overseeing the operation of public mental 
 
 74. States may have a stronger incentive to seek to rein in prescription drug prices because of the 
severity of their budgetary challenges. 
 75. See, e.g., North Carolina Medicaid Program, BENEFITS.GOV, https://www.benefits.gov/ 
benefit/1390 [https://perma.cc/2LT6-SWNL]. 
 76. See Sachs, Delinking Reimbursement, supra note 63, at 2309 (“In the United States, federal law 
requires Medicare and Medicaid to cover most, and in many cases all, FDA-approved drugs.”). 
 77. See Isaac D. Buck, Furthering the Fiduciary Metaphor: The Duty of Providers to the Payers of 
Medicare, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1043, 1068 (2016) (“[I]n many clinical scenarios, the provider retains 
unlimited discretion to choose among options that range in cost-effectiveness.”). 
 78. See HEATHER POOLE, CONN. OFF. OF LEGIS. RSCH., SELECTED STATES’ R&D TAX 
CREDITS 1–2 (2015), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2015/rpt/pdf/2015-R-0209.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5PH-
M44Q] (comparing various states’ exemptions); How Effective Are State R&D Tax Credits?, SSTI 
(Mar. 13, 2013), https://ssti.org/blog/how-effective-are-state-rd-tax-credits [https://perma.cc/E7SE-
Q6YX] (summarizing how states compete for research and development jobs and economic 
development). 
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health facilities, 79  perhaps the most visible example of state health care 
funding is the role that the state plays in funding its Medicaid program.80 
This includes paying for Medicaid beneficiaries’ prescription drugs.81 In this 
role, states have discretion to determine how much coverage or funding they 
provide, often making decisions about scope and breadth of coverage for their 
most vulnerable public insurance beneficiaries.82 
More generally, states have also taken actions that impact the number of 
citizens qualifying for Medicaid coverage. Since the passage of the ACA, a 
number of states have refused to expand access to Medicaid for their 
citizens. 83  Although shrinking, about thirty percent of states have not 
established or implemented Medicaid expansion under the ACA, leaving 
federal funding on the table in an era of tight budgets.84 In addition to 
refusing to expand their Medicaid programs, states have also sought to impose 
additional burdens on citizens who are seeking to qualify for their state’s 
Medicaid program. For example, states have been seeking to change the 
breadth of their Medicaid programs by structuring work requirements for 
their beneficiaries.85 But these efforts—to this point—have been enjoined by 
federal courts.86 
Aside from limiting enrollment in the preeminent, state-funded health 
insurance program, states can limit the number and/or type of services 
available to beneficiaries enrolled in the program. In addition to narrowing 
 
 79. See, e.g., State Mental Health Agency (SMHA) Per Capita Mental Health Services Expenditures, 
KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/smha-expenditures-per-capita/ 
?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D 
[https://perma.cc/K864-S7QY] (displaying the mental health service expenditures per individual 
state). 
 80. See MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N, supra note 39. 
 81. See, e.g., Isaac D. Buck, States as Activists, 39 J. LEGAL MED. 121, 126 (2019) [hereinafter 
Buck, States as Activists]; Pear, supra note 44 (noting Massachusetts’s budget for prescription drug 
pricing now exceeds $2 billion annually). 
 82. See Galewitz, supra note 73. 
 83. See Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions: Interactive Map, KAISER 
FAM.  FOUND.  (Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/status-of-state-medicaid-
expansion-decisions-interactive-map/ [https://perma.cc/5HG7-MHKZ]. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See Vann R. Newkirk II, The Fight Over Medicaid Begins in Kentucky, ATLANTIC (June 29, 
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/06/judge-halts-kentuckys-medicaid-work-
requirements/564218/ [https://perma.cc/AJ7L-JPEJ (dark archive)]. Currently, the most prominent 
battlefield involves the fight over Medicaid work requirements. Kentucky’s work requirements were 
approved by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services in early 2018 but have been blocked by 
a federal court. See id. 
 86. See, e.g., Stewart v. Azar, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125, 147–48, 156 (D.D.C. 2019) (enjoining 
Kentucky’s effort to install work requirements within its Medicaid program), appeal filed, Stewart v. 
Azar, No. 19-5097 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 11, 2019). Kentucky has since rescinded its Medicaid work 
requirement waiver. See Kentucky Officially Withdraws Its Medicaid Work Requirement Waiver, 
ADVISORY BD. (Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/2019/12/18/kentucky 
[https://perma.cc/52YP-VFE9]. 
99 N.C. L. REV. 167 (2020) 
182 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99 
coverage enrollment, states can also make that coverage shallower, as long as 
any changes comply with federal law.87 In this way, state discretion is limited 
by federal law.88 
Specifically, states are required to cover most drugs that are FDA 
approved—albeit at a discounted price.89 But, as prices rise, “those fractional 
rebates no longer suffice to defray the burden of rising costs.” 90  Three 
examples of limitations that make for shallower coverage for prescription 
drugs involve per-month-per-beneficiary limitations or caps, such as the one 
seen in Illinois; prior authorization; and automatic substitution laws. 
Medicaid Prescription Caps. One way that a state can impact its 
prescription drug budget is to simply limit the number of prescriptions 
beneficiaries on Medicaid can access in the first place. Though a blunt 
instrument, a growing number of states have implemented so-called 
“Medicaid cap policies” for prescription drugs,91 nearly doubling from twelve 
states in 2001 to twenty states in 2010.92 Characterized as policies that limit 
the amount of prescription drugs a Medicaid beneficiary can receive over the 
course of a month, caps have been cost-cutting tools that states can deploy to 
shrink a state’s prescription drug budget.93 
 
 87. See Huberfeld, supra note 55, at 79 (“Although the Medicaid Act has provided a baseline for 
states regarding standards for medical welfare, the program has allowed huge amounts of state 
variation within the federal rules so long as states have not provided less (on paper) than the federal 
statute requires.”). 
 88. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a–1396b-1(c) (defining the parameters that circumscribe state 
financial participation in and administration of medical assistance programs under federal law). 
 89. Rachel Sachs, Your Weekly Reminder That FDA Approval and Insurance Coverage Are Often 
Linked, BILL HEALTH BLOG (Nov. 30, 2016), https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/ 
2016/11/30/your-weekly-reminder-that-fda-approval-and-insurance-coverage-are-often-linked/ 
[https://perma.cc/3JAR-6EHA] (“Medicaid must cover essentially all FDA-approved drugs . . . .”). 
 90. See Shefali Luthra, Massachusetts Grabs Spotlight by Proposing New Twist on Medicaid Drug 
Coverage, WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-
science/massachusetts-grabs-spotlight-by-proposing-new-twist-on-medicaid-drug-coverage/2017/11/ 
19/df4e7a52-cae7-11e7-aa96-54417592cf72_story.html?utm_term=.58aa0fc9ec1e [https://perma.cc/ 
EL62-UP7R (dark archive)]. 
 91. See Daniel A. Lieberman, Jennifer M. Polinski, Niteesh K. Choudhry, Jerry Avorn & 
Michael A. Fischer, Medicaid Prescription Limits: Policy Trends and Comparative Impact on Utilization, 
BMC HEALTH SERVS. RSCH., Jan. 15, 2016, at 1–2, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/ 
articles/PMC4714442/pdf/12913_2016_Article_1258.pdf [https://perma.cc/LZ97-WBSP]. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See, e.g., Four Prescription Policy, ILL. DEP’T HEALTHCARE & FAM. SERVS., 
https://www.illinois.gov/hfs/medicalproviders/pharmacy/pages/fourprescriptionpolicy.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/RJ38-GPU6] (“The four prescription policy was developed as a result of budget 
negotiations, but best-practices call for an annual review of the full regimen of prescriptions for any 
patient.”). The policy also seeks to reduce unnecessary medications. Id. Starting in 2020, Illinois 
instituted a uniform preferred drug list. See Heads Up! New Illinois Medicaid Prescription Drug Policy 
Coming Jan. 1, 2020, AIDS FOUND. CHI. (Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.aidschicago.org/page/news/all-
news/heads-up-new-illinois-medicaid-prescription-drug-policy-coming-jan-1-2020 
[https://perma.cc/NF79-NGLN]. 
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Unsurprisingly, these laws may save money for states (although this is 
disputed)94 but may also negatively impact access. In addition to limiting 
health care access, these laws may change the type of health care services 
needed. For example, a recent study concluded that “caps decreased the use of 
preventive but not symptomatic essential medications.”95 But the laws also 
“shifted usage from branded drugs to generics, with considerable savings.”96 
The specific story of New Hampshire, an early adopter of caps, is 
informative. New Hampshire prevented its Medicaid beneficiaries from filling 
more than three medications per month starting in 1981. 97  This policy 
scrambled health care access, causing “decreased use of essential medications, 
increased nursing home admissions, and increased use of emergency services 
by patients with schizophrenia.”98 Nonetheless, the popularity of these cap 
laws among the states continues to grow.99 
Since 2013, Illinois has limited the amount of prescriptions that each 
Medicaid beneficiary can have filled in a thirty-day period to four. 100 A 
number of types of drugs—including oncolytics and contraceptives—are 
exempted from the policy.101 Further, Illinois has clearly noted that the policy 
“is not a ‘hard’ limit,” and that “Medicaid patients can and should have access 
to medications that are medically necessary, even if they exceed four 
prescriptions per 30 days.”102 Correspondingly, according to Illinois Medicaid, 
“[t]he policy simply requires prior approval for prescriptions above the 
limit.”103 
A state’s cap law is an example of state action that best characterizes a 
prescription policy that defines the state’s role as payer. While these laws 
directly impact a state’s Medicaid budget, they do not impact the overall list 
price of prescription drugs. 104 In this way, they are a particularly blunt 
instrument for a state seeking to cut its prescription drug budget. These cap 
 
 94. See NAT’L CMTY. PHARMACISTS ASS’N, EFFECTIVELY MANAGING A MEDICAID 
PHARMACY BENEFIT PROGRAM, http://www.ncpanet.org/pdf/leg/nov12/medicaid_manual.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BZU6-X9XU (staff-uploaded archive)] (“Arbitrary medication caps rarely save 
money. Targeted, evidence-based precertification programs utilizing the best technology and step 
therapy are far more financially productive and produce better patient outcomes.”). 
 95. Lieberman et al., supra note 91, at 1. 
 96. See id. 
 97. See id. at 8. 
 98. See id. at 2. 
 99. See id. 
 100. See ILL. DEP’T HEALTHCARE & FAM. SERVS., supra note 93. 
 101. See id. 
 102. See id. 
 103. See id. 
 104. A list price is the price initially listed for a drug before discounts and rebates are added. See 
Robert W. Dubois, Rx Drug Costs: List Prices Versus Net Prices and the Importance of Staying Within the 
Data, HEALTH AFFS.: HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/ 
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laws cut the budgets for states who impose these limits,105 but they do so by 
limiting the amount of medically necessary prescriptions that are available to 
Medicaid beneficiaries. They also only apply to the Medicaid population, 
thereby lacking the hallmarks of an enduring and universal solution to the 
prescription-drug crisis. 
Prior Authorization Laws. Another way states can attempt to limit the 
utilization of expensive drugs is through prior authorization laws. These 
programs allow Medicaid programs to trim the Medicaid budget by requiring 
that the provider seek preapproval before being allowed to prescribe a drug 
not on the preferred drug list for a Medicaid beneficiary.106 While not much is 
known about the impact of these laws on access, recent studies have suggested 
that “prior authorization processes cause some beneficiaries and providers 
access and bureaucratic problems.”107 
Generic Substitution Laws. Generic substitution laws have proliferated 
throughout the country. 108  By 2018, forty-five states had automatic 
substitution laws, with the first signed by eight states in their 2013–14 
legislative sessions. 109  These laws are also quite diverse: some mandate 
substitution—that is, if there is an interchangeable generic available, that the 
generic be substituted for the brand name drug.110 Others give the pharmacist 
discretion to substitute generics.111 Some require patient consent.112 Notably, 
in order to be eligible, state laws require that the substitution products are 
deemed interchangeable by the FDA.113 Substitution can save a substantial 
 
 105. See Lieberman et al., supra note 91, at 1 (noting that the laws led to decreases in spending for 
“preventive essential medications,” “[b]rand cap implementation,” and “medication classes with 
generic replacements”). 
 106. See Medicaid’s Prescription Drug Benefit: Key Facts, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (May 1, 2019), 
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/fact-sheet/medicaids-prescription-drug-benefit-key-facts/ [https:// 
perma.cc/MNU8-HSUL]. 
 107. See JANE TILLY & LINDA ELAM, KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, 
PRIOR AUTHORIZATION FOR MEDICAID PRESCRIPTION DRUGS IN FIVE STATES: LESSONS FOR 
POLICY MAKERS 1 (2003), http://files.kff.org/attachment/report-prior-authorization-for-medicaid-
prescription-drugs-in [https://perma.cc/SY75-M98R]. 
 108. See Richard Cauchi, State Laws and Legislation Related to Biologic Medications and Substitution 
of Biosimilars, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (May 3, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/ 
research/health/state-laws-and-legislation-related-to-biologic-medications-and-substitution-of-
biosimilars.aspx [https://perma.cc/6X7B-CTLH]. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See Joseph S. Ross, Therapeutic Substitution—Should It Be Systematic or Automatic?, 176 JAMA 
INTERNAL MED. 776, 776 (2016) (highlighting the differences between automatic substitution and 
therapeutic substitution). 
 111. Id. 
 112. William H. Shrank, Niteesh K. Choudhry, Jessica Agnew-Blais, Alex D. Federman, Joshua 
N. Liberman, Jun Liu, Aaron S. Kesselheim, M. Alan Brookhart & Michael A. Fischer, State Generic 
Substitution Laws Can Lower Drug Outlays Under Medicaid, 29 HEALTH AFFS. 1383, 1384 (2010). 
 113. See Cauchi, supra note 108. 
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amount of money.114 Widening the definition of what is interchangeable—
including relying on therapeutic substitution, which would widen the 
availability of generic substitutions—could also save payers billions of 
dollars.115 
* * * 
The state as payer model can provide effective solutions for state budgets 
but often has a limited impact in affecting pharmaceutical drug prices from a 
holistic perspective. Nonetheless, states continue to rely on policy solutions 
that are from the payer paradigm. Concerns about access will likely follow 
those solutions. 
2.  State as Consumer 
States can act as consumers of health care services and products. In this 
role, states are empowered, much like individual customers, to purchase health 
care services and products from the sellers of those products and services—
hospitals, providers, and pharmaceutical companies. This role—which most 
commonly takes place in the context of the Medicaid program for states—
empowers the state to act as would an insurance company. For example, the 
state of Arizona “purchases” services on behalf of its Medicaid beneficiaries 
just like an Arizona private insurer, such as BlueCross BlueShield, would.116 
What differentiates the state as consumer from the state as a payer is 
that, in acting as a customer, the state adopts policy prescriptions that are 
geared toward actively forcing sellers to reduce prices. Instead of cutting 
services or constricting access to more expensive treatments or products—
actions a state as payer would deploy—states as customers try to use their 
leverage to negotiate with providers and other sellers over pricing. In this role, 
state officials may be better positioned to accomplish the important goal of 
lowering the overall cost of health care without negatively impacting access. 
Examples of the states-as-consumer paradigm can be seen in a flurry of 
new cost-efficiency efforts across the country. 117 Some of the states have 
moved on to so-called “outcomes-based purchasing,” which allows the state to 
pay for drugs based on the clinical effectiveness of the product.118 Others, 
 
 114. See Shrank et al., supra note 112, at 1383. 
 115. See Ross, supra note 110 (highlighting the differences between automatic substitution and 
therapeutic substitution). Also, Ross notes that nearly $75 billion could be saved in allowing a 
substitution of a within-class generic in lieu of only an interchangeable generic. Id. 
 116. See BLUECROSS BLUESHIELD OF ARIZ., EVERDAYHEALTH PPO (2017), 
https://www.azblue.com/~/media/azblue/files/employers/benefit-books/2017-ng1to50/2017-ste-e-
group-everydayhealth-100-alliance-off-final--20172-0117.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/K2R8-XD8W]. 
 117. See infra Section I.B.3 and accompanying text. 
 118. See infra notes 121–34 and accompanying text. 
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including Washington and Louisiana, have deployed “subscription” models in 
which the state pays a flat fee for unlimited access to particularly expensive 
drugs for its Medicaid beneficiaries and state prisoners. 119  And the 
Massachusetts model allows states to acquire more negotiating leverage 
through a formulary that is constructed based on price efficiency.120 The three 
related models are summarized below. 
Outcomes-Based Purchasing. In 2018, three states—Oklahoma, 121 
Michigan, 122 and Colorado 123—all received approval from the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) for so-called outcomes-based 
contracts with pharmaceutical companies. Outcomes-based contracts provide 
for the drug manufacturer to retain some of the financial risk of drug failure in 
an effort to save the state money.124 Whatever the clinical goal, outcomes-
based contracts allow the original drug price to remain “in place if a specified 
percentage of patients achieves the agreed-upon outcome. But if the outcome 
threshold is not met, the manufacturer refunds some of the original price to 
the payer.”125 The state is issued a rebate check if the drug does not perform as 
expected.126 
In Oklahoma, drug companies whose drugs fail to perform as promised 
are required to pay a rebate that matches either the price of the drug or the 
cost of additional treatment needed after the drug’s ineffectiveness. 127 
Michigan’s proposal, approved in late 2018, mirrors Oklahoma’s approach in 
that it allows state officials “to leverage additional rebate agreements for 
 
 119. See Melinda Deslatte, Louisiana Reaches ‘Netflix-Model’ Deal To Tackle Hepatitis C, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 26, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/bc074b5c06024926a5c58163de8bab9d 
[https://perma.cc/62JJ-BS7W]; Ricky Zipp, Washington’s Hepatitis C Subscription Model Approved by 
Medicaid Agency, S&P GLOB. (June 13, 2019), https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/ 
en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/washington-s-hepatitis-c-subscription-model-approved-by-
medicaid-agency-52366464 [https://perma.cc/9CQX-7QQ8]. 
 120. See infra notes 157–63 and accompanying text. 
 121. See OHCA Receives OK for Drug Pricing Initiative, OKLA. HEALTH CARE AUTH. (June 28, 
2018), http://www.okhca.org/about.aspx?id=22227 [https://perma.cc/5654-KF3B]. 
 122. See Susannah Luthi, Medicaid OKs Michigan Waiver To Negotiate Drug Prices Based on 
Outcomes, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Nov. 14, 2018, 12:00 AM), https://www.modernhealthcare.com 
/article/20181114/NEWS/181119978/medicaid-oks-michigan-waiver-to-negotiate-drug-prices-based-
on-outcomes [https://perma.cc/E9T5-L7V5 (dark archive)]. 
 123. CMS OKs Colorado’s Waiver for Medicaid Value-Based Purchasing, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Feb. 
25, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20190225/NEWS/190229950/cms-
oks-colorado-s-waiver-for-medicaid-value-based-purchasing [https://perma.cc/AA8C-S8G (dark 
archive)]. 
 124. See ELIZABETH SEELEY & AARON S. KESSELHEIM, OUTCOMES-BASED 
PHARMACEUTICAL CONTRACTS: AN ANSWER TO HIGH U.S. DRUG SPENDING? 2 (2017), 
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/sites/default/files/documents/___media_files_publications_issu
e_brief_2017_sep_seeley_outcomes_based_pharma_contracts_ib.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KRQ-6SM7]. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See id. 
 127. See OKLA. HEALTH CARE AUTH., supra note 121. 
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‘outcomes-based’ contracts with manufacturers.”128 Colorado followed suit in 
early 2019.129 
But outcomes-based contracts have been far from a silver bullet.130 A 
2017 study concluded that these contracts could be plagued by a number of 
challenges—including that they would not (1) apply to a large subset of drugs, 
(2) sufficiently take into account patient health, (3) save patients’ out-of-
pocket costs, nor (4) save the state any money, among other concerns.131 
Indeed, eight months after initial approval of the program, for example, 
Oklahoma had entered into only four contracts with pharmaceutical 
companies for treatments that covered only 1,700 patients—a shadow of the 
more than 800,000 Medicaid enrollees in the state.132 The program faced 
“significant roadblocks,” as drug companies seemed particularly reticent to 
enter into such agreements. 133  Coming up with specific definitions and 
determining when certain conditions under the program apply continues to 
pose a major challenge for state bureaucrats, impacting the program’s overall 
effectiveness.134 
The Subscription Model. In the summer of 2019, both Washington and 
Louisiana made news by receiving approval from CMS to enter into 
“subscription model[s]” to provide treatment for their residents with 
Hepatitis C.135 Popularized in Australia in 2015, these models mirror popular 
 
 128. Luthi, supra note 122. 
 129. See CMS OKs Colorado’s Waiver for Medicaid Value-Based Purchasing, supra note 123. 
 130. See Harris Meyer, As a Cure for High Drug Prices, Outcomes-Based Deals Aren’t Delivering Yet, 
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viable solution to the broad problem of prescription drug affordability in the U.S. 
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 133. See id. 
 134. See id. 
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[https://perma.cc/B3ZE-TXS2]. 
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online streaming subscription services by allowing states to use an unlimited 
amount of drugs for a set period of time.136 The model seems to be gaining 
traction at the state level and may provide a creative solution—at least for 
some drugs—to the cost crisis,137 particularly because it does not negatively 
impact access to the drugs. 
Starting on July 15, 2019, Louisiana began offering a generic form of 
Epclusa, a drug that treats Hepatitis C, to its Medicaid and prison 
populations. 138  Entering into an agreement with Asegua Therapeutics (a 
Gilead subsidiary), Louisiana was set to pay a flat annual fee for unlimited 
access to as much Epclusa as it needed.139 Under this model, also referred to as 
“Netflix pricing” by the state’s health secretary, Louisiana was set to pay $58 
million annually for five years (a total of about $290 million), allowing the 
state—according to state officials—to treat more than thirty thousand 
individuals afflicted with the disease.140 
The arrangement was hailed as an achievement by state officials, who 
said that Louisiana was unable to afford a traditional payment model to pay 
for Epclusa in the past because it would have cost the state more than $750 
million annually. 141  CMS approved Louisiana’s request for the plan, as 
supplemental rebates do not run afoul of the Medicaid best price rule.142 
Noting that CMS’s approval could also be given to other states’ similar plans, 
CMS Administrator Seema Verma also wrote that “CMS is committed to 
giving [states] flexibility to confront the challenges they face” in its 
approval.143 
 
 136. See Tina Rosenberg, Treat Medicines Like Netflix Treats Shows, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2019), 
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 142. See 42 C.F.R. § 447.505(d)(6) (2019) (stating that “[r]ebates under the national rebate 
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Plan, supra note 135. Supplemental rebates are allowed under the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program 
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REBATE  PROGRAM 5 (2019), https://www.americanactionforum.org/print/?url=https://www 
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A month before Louisiana’s approval, Washington received CMS 
approval for a similar plan.144 Unlike Louisiana’s, Washington’s plan features a 
“winner take all” competitive bidding program.145 The proposed plan would 
award the winning pharmaceutical-company bidder a contract that would 
allow the state unlimited access until 2023 for a set price.146 The proposal 
would cover drug costs for a larger population, including Washington’s 
Medicaid program beneficiaries, state prisoners, state employees, retirees, and 
teachers. 147  Individuals with state-purchased health insurance coverage 
constitute about 30,000 of Washington’s 60,000 citizens who are infected with 
Hepatitis C.148 
Medicaid Waivers and Other Direct Negotiations. In late 2017, 
Massachusetts attempted to use state discretion over its Medicaid program to 
inject consumer-based negotiation tools and filed a § 1115 waiver under the 
Medicaid Act.149 This proposal would have given Massachusetts the authority 
to limit its drug formulary, which is the list of drugs that are covered by its 
Medicaid program.150 In this way, Massachusetts would have been empowered 
with additional leverage to negotiate for steeper discounts in the drugs that its 
program ultimately covered.151 
The upside of such a system would have allowed Massachusetts to 
achieve additional discounts, cutting the costs of pharmaceutical drugs without 
sacrificing access for its beneficiaries, largely because the proposal was set to 
provide coverage for at least one medication “per therapeutic class” and also 
had an appeals process for those whom off-formulary drugs were medically 
necessary.152 This new proposal would have aligned Massachusetts’s Medicaid 
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program with the coverage provided by private insurers and pharmacy benefit 
managers (“PBMs”).153 These entities “frequently decline to cover drugs for 
which there are cheaper alternatives.”154 Practically, eliminating a drug from 
coverage would entice the manufacturer to negotiate with the state for a more 
sustainable price, cutting costs for the state.155 But after the formulary waiver 
was denied by CMS in 2018, Massachusetts moved on to other direct 
negotiation plans.156 
Massachusetts legislators made news in the summer of 2019 after passing 
a bill that would start “direct negotiations with drug companies for high-
priced drugs.”157 Under the proposed program, the governor would be able to 
begin negotiations with pharmaceutical companies if the drug costs more than 
$25,000 annually per patient or if the state pays more than $10 million 
annually for the drug.158 According to Governor Charlie Baker, the prices of 
drugs in Massachusetts have “nearly doubled since 2012,” and the new plan 
would give the governor a number of new tools should direct negotiations 
fail.159 Interestingly, drugs that treat Hepatitis C are likely to fall within the 
ambit of the bill—including Epclusa, the drug that is the subject of 
Louisiana’s subscription pricing plan.160 Massachusetts spent more than $80 
million on Epclusa in 2018.161 
If negotiations do fail, under the state plan, the governor would be 
empowered to raise public pressure by suggesting a fairer price, establishing 
public hearings, or his office could ask the Massachusetts Health Policy 
Commission to establish a fair price. 162  But in the new Massachusetts 
program, there is no referral to the Massachusetts attorney general for unfair 
or excessive price increases.163 
* * * 
Empowering the state to leverage its market share in the health care 
marketplace to bring down the costs of prescription drugs encourages creative 
and effective solutions. Like the state-as-payer model, the state-as-consumer 
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 156. For more on the story of Massachusetts, see infra Section II.C. 
 157. Martha Bebinger, Massachusetts Moves To Negotiate Medicaid Drug Prices, WBUR 
(July 22, 2019), https://www.wbur.org/commonhealth/2019/07/22/massachusetts-budget-drug-price-
controls [https://perma.cc/7FUG-SWLG]. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id.; Deslatte, supra note 119 (“Louisiana will pay . . . for access to the generic form of the 
antiviral medication Epclusa . . . .”). 
 161. Bebinger, supra note 157. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
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approaches of outcomes-based reimbursement, subscription models, and 
increased negotiation seem to address the state’s burden for the cost of 
prescription drugs. In other words, the plans—at least to this point—are 
geared toward programs that are paid for by the state, like state Medicaid 
programs. A universal solution—a subscription plan or outcome-based 
reimbursement plan for all citizens in the state, regardless of payer—could be 
more effective in addressing drug prices. Nonetheless, these programs could 
constitute the first steps toward something more holistic and may spread to 
other payers if successful. 
3.  State as Market Facilitator 
A state may aim to take a more agnostic role than the one it occupies in 
the customer paradigm and instead seek to improve the efficiency of health 
care delivery by improving the innerworkings of the marketplace. To assist 
providers and patients in making more cost-effective decisions, the state can 
support or mandate market-facilitating rules and initiatives. 164  The most 
prominent example of market-facilitating programs and rules regarding 
pharmaceutical drugs are price-transparency laws. While their effectiveness 
remains questionable, the laws are proliferating nationwide. The other 
example is wholesale importation, which opens up a new market to consumers. 
This role seeks to protect citizens’ access to health insurance and care, 
but—like the state-as-funder role—it remains largely passive. The success of 
these initiatives often depends on the voluntary participation of companies, 
patients, and providers in actually deploying decision aids that strive for cost-
effectiveness and other price-transparency tools. 165  While these laws and 
programs seek to improve cost-effectiveness, most do not require a connection 
between increased transparency and clinical decision-making. A physician or 
patient can ignore the reported information at her own whim. As it goes 
 
 164. This can also be seen with new state laws that require providers to use decision aids in 
determining a course of treatment. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.060(2)(c). The state is not 
mandating a particular course of action, nor pressuring providers to choose a particular course of 
treatment, but is seeking to improve the capacity for, and possibility of, reasonable and effective 
decision making. See, e.g., id. 
 165. See Phil Galewitz, Doctors Slow To Adopt Tech Tools That Might Save Patients Money on Drugs, 
NPR (July 5, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/07/05/738283044/ 
doctors-slow-to-adopt-tech-tools-that-might-save-patients-money-on-drugs [https://perma.cc/Q9AY-
ARK6] (“Still, doctors have been slow to adopt the technology, sometimes because of concerns about 
getting bogged down in long discussions about drug costs. Humana, for example, introduced its drug 
pricing tool to its network of doctors in 2015. Today, fewer than 10% are using it, according to 
Humana officials.”). 
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without saying, patients are free to ignore any of the market-facilitating tools 
that the state implements.166 
A state’s attempts to alleviate or solve its worst inefficiencies by trying to 
make the health care marketplace operate as would any other marketplace 
often suffer from serious challenges.167 The state-as-facilitator role mirrors 
many of the changes brought about at the federal level by the ACA168 by 
seeking to supercharge the power and functionality of the private market.169 
Similarly, these new pushes—mandating increased information and 
transparency but no pricing or spending limits—may also go a long way in 
explaining the law’s shortcomings.170 Perhaps legislative bodies’ belief that 
patients simply need more information belies the data that suggests patients 
do not use or check pricing information, even when it is made available to 
them.171 As a result, somewhat counterintuitively, increased availability of data 
does not lead to a reduction in the amount of health care expenditures for 
individuals.172 
Beyond failing to impact individuals’ decision making, these actions do 
not actively impact the price of services. In fact, the state in the facilitator role 
may operate with an agnosticism as to the overall price of drugs in the 
marketplace. And although facilitating initiatives may have varying 
effectiveness, states continue to implement programs intended to assist the 
functioning of the health care market. 173  Though this may hold some 
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 168. See Isaac D. Buck, Affording Obamacare, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 261, 271 (2020). 
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found that price transparency did not reduce outpatient spending, even among patients with higher 
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“[h]ealth plans report that use of their price transparency tools is limited, with many 
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Id. 
 172. Id. (“One study found that only 1 percent of residents of New Hampshire used the state’s 
health care price comparison website over a three-year period.”). 
 173. See, e.g., Steven Findlay, supra note 34 (“The majority of states now have such transparency 
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regulatory promise, the federal government has sent mixed signals on its 
willingness to allow this type of regulatory solution. 
“Transparency” Laws. Exemplifying the move to increase transparency in 
drug pricing, four states—Nevada, California, Vermont, and Louisiana—have 
passed legislation over the last few years. These actions do not include any 
penalty for providers, insurers, or hospitals that fail to use the drug-pricing 
information in making coverage or clinical decisions, so these transparency 
laws may have a limited impact on the global cost of pharmaceutical drugs. 
Nonetheless, in these four states, pharmaceutical companies are required to 
report pricing information—with some states requiring additional 
information—to state officials. These states’ laws seek to publicize and/or 
track pharmaceutical drugs’ price increases to various degrees, purportedly 
attempting to use the power of oversight and the disinfectant of publicity in 
the realm of prescription drug pricing. Whether these laws have a real impact 
on state budgets remains an open question. 
In June of 2017, Nevada Governor Brian Sandoval signed a bill into law 
that forced “pharmaceutical companies to release insulin prices,” which 
became the “country’s strictest drug-price disclosure rule.”174 It specifically 
required the Department of Health and Human Services to compile a report 
disclosing the costs for “all forms of insulin,” manufacturing costs for 
“producing the drug[s],” and research investments and projects.175 This law’s 
mandate targets PBMs, requiring them to “disclose what rebates they 
negotiate with diabetes drugmakers” and the discounts and rebates they 
receive. 176  It also applies beyond pharmaceutical companies and PBMs, 
requiring sales representatives to register with the state and nonprofits to 
report any funding received from pharmaceutical companies, PBMs, and 
insurance companies.177 
The bill, which was a weaker, second iteration178 growing out of the same 
effort to rein in insulin pricing, aimed to bring down the costs of insulin drugs 
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for the nearly 300,000 adults in Nevada living with diabetes. 179  The 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (“PhRMA”) and the 
Biotechnology Innovation Organization (“BIO”) immediately sued Nevada in 
the late summer of 2017, alleging that the law was unconstitutional.180 A 
federal district court judge denied a request for an injunction in the fall of 
2017, finding a lack of immediate harm.181 The lawsuit was dropped in the 
summer of 2018.182 And since the insulin transparency law took effect, Nevada 
has further mandated the reporting of pricing for asthma medications.183 
Similarly, California passed a law that requires companies to give sixty-
day notice “prior to the planned effective date of [an] increase” in the 
“wholesale acquisition cost of a prescription drug,” including the cumulative 
increases “within the previous two calendar years.”184 It has been called “the 
most comprehensive drug price transparency bill in the nation,” requiring 
“drug makers to publicly justify big price hikes.”185 Further, under the law, 
health insurers are forced “to report what percentage of premium increases are 
due to drug prices.”186 If the pharmaceutical company failed to report this 
information, the state would impose civil monetary penalties, “but the bill 
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SAFETY CODE § 127677(a)–(b) (Westlaw current with urgency legislation through Ch. 372 of 2020 
Reg. Sess.)). 
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doesn’t directly prohibit drug companies from price increases.”187 And like in 
Nevada, PhRMA has claimed that the law is unconstitutional, filing suit in 
U.S. district court in Sacramento in late 2017.188 The law, which went into 
effect in January of 2018, “doesn’t directly affect [the] prices” of drugs.189 But 
“proponents [of the law] hope that advance warnings—and mandating that 
manufacturers justify the increases—will generate enough public pressure to 
hold down prices.”190 In the fall of 2019, the law led to the revelation that 
pharmaceutical companies raised the wholesale acquisition costs of their 
products by a median of nearly twenty-six percent from 2017 to 2019.191 
Vermont was the first state to require the reporting of wholesale 
acquisition prices (“WACs”). Vermont’s law required pharmaceutical 
companies to disclose price increase justifications to the state attorney general 
starting in 2016. 192  Interestingly, this law required that the information 
disclosed to the state attorney general be kept from public view and only 
allowed the attorney general’s summaries to be made available to the public.193 
Thus, the state was powerless to either prevent or cap the price increases; the 
only remedy available to the state was a $10,000 fine to be used against 
pharmaceutical companies that failed to provide sufficient information in their 
reports.194 
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Nevertheless, Vermont’s law required limited public disclosure of drugs 
that “had price increases of 15% in the past year, or 50% over the last five 
years.”195 In the first report in 2016, ten drugs fell into that category—many of 
which had increased more than 20% over the previous year, or that had 
increased more than 100% over the previous five years.196 In 2017, the law had 
“yielded limited information,” and “visibly frustrated” legislators considered 
changing the law to allow the public more access to the information.197 This 
led to a “strengthening” of the law in 2018, adding new reporting 
requirements for insurers and drug manufacturers and requiring the formation 
of a working group that is charged with investigating pricing in an effort to 
identify savings for the state.198 
Similarly, Louisiana passed a pair of drug-pricing transparency bills in 
the summer of 2017.199 The bills mandated that pharmaceutical manufacturers 
that sold in the state disclose quarterly WAC prices to the Louisiana Board of 
Pharmacy200 and that the Louisiana Board of Pharmacy “post on a website 
those WAC prices, organized by therapeutic category.” 201  Further, the 
licensing boards were required to “advise [the prescribers] at least once 
annually of the opportunity to access this website.”202 Under the laws, PBMs 
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were forced to report the rebates they received, and health insurers were 
required to report to beneficiaries when they received a better price than the 
beneficiary.203 
Interestingly, the laws required the Board of Pharmacy to apply for, and 
receive, private grant funding to support the construction of the website.204 
Like in Nevada, these laws in Louisiana were watered-down versions of the 
original proposals that sought to impose additional pricing and cost 
disclosures.205 
Wholesale Importation. In May of 2018, Vermont became the first state to 
pass a law that allowed the state to begin working toward achieving the 
importation of drugs from Canada.206 Nonetheless, the law requires the state 
to seek approval from Health and Human Services (“HHS”), which has not 
yet occurred. 207 For his part, HHS Secretary Alex Azar has called drug 
importation plans a “gimmick” and has argued that “the U.S. government 
cannot adequately certify the safety of imported drugs.”208 Skeptics of such 
laws reference the safety critique, arguing that “American regulators can’t 
effectively determine whether imported drugs meet the same safety standards 
as those sold directly in the United States.”209 By the end of 2019, Vermont 
had submitted an application and concept paper to the federal government in 
an effort to operationalize its importation program.210 
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By the summer of 2019, three more states had joined Vermont—Maine, 
Florida, and Colorado—with drug importation laws. 211  Even though the 
Trump administration signaled that it could support the laws 212 and has 
proposed a plan that would allow drugs from other countries to be sold in the 
United States,213 HHS has never approved drug reimportation. And drug 
reimportation plans may have an enemy in the Canadian government: “[i]f 
Canadian prices are used to bring down American prices, drugmakers have a 
reason to just charge more up north.”214 
Nonetheless, the Trump administration made news in the summer of 
2019, signaling that it was likely to approve two pathways that would make 
drug importation a reality.215 This included the creation of a pilot program as 
well as drafting new safety rules and guidelines for pharmaceutical companies 
that wished to participate in importation.216 A number of additional states 
debated bills to import drugs from Canada, 217  and more than half had 
proposed importation laws in 2019.218 
* * * 
While many states are operating in facilitator roles to improve the inner 
workings of the health care marketplace, the effectiveness of such efforts 
remains an open question. Drug transparency laws have limited utility, and 
drug importation plans—while attractive and simple—pose challenges, the 
most formidable of which is likely to be federal agency approval and potential 
legal review.219 The state’s role as facilitator—exemplified primarily by an 
agnostic view toward the cost of prescription drugs and federal threats—may 
constitute an uphill battle to directly solve the prescription-drug-cost crisis. 
 
 211. See Bill Chappell, Trump Administration Plans To Allow Imports of Some Prescription Drugs from 
Canada, NPR (July 31, 2019, 9:24 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/31/746905508/trump-
administration-plans-to-let-prescription-drugs-be-imported-to-u-s [https://perma.cc/CN5V-6VK5]. 
 212. Id. 
 213. See Tami Luhby, Trump Administration Proposes Allowing Imports of Certain Drugs from 
Canada, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/18/politics/us-drug-importation-canada/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/A2T3-3WHM] (Dec. 18, 2019, 4:28 PM). 
 214. See Luthra & Galewitz, supra note 41. Reimportation refers to the process of importing 
drugs that were manufactured domestically and then exported to other countries back into the United 
States. See Meredith Freed, Tricia Neuman & Juliette Cubanski, 10 FAQs on Prescription Drug 
Importation, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 8, 2020), https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/10-faqs-
on-prescription-drug-importation/ [https://perma.cc/TW2J-J83M]. 
 215. See Chappell, supra note 211. 
 216. See id. 
 217. See Four More States Submit Bills To Import Prescription Drugs from Canada, NAT’L ACAD. FOR 
STATE HEALTH POL’Y (Feb. 6, 2018), https://nashp.org/four-more-states-submit-bills-to-import-
prescription-drugs-from-canada/ [https://perma.cc/4QY9-7JRY]. 
 218. See Chappell, supra note 211. 
 219. See id. (“Wednesday’s announcement marks the first step in the process. It could take years 
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4.  State as Overseer 
Beyond acting as a payer, consumer, or facilitator, a state may take on a 
more active role. Perhaps the state decides to directly oversee the prescription 
drug market—and its costs—and reviews the prices of products and ultimately 
has authority to either approve or block certain drug company proposals. This 
gives the state an enforcement role—it is not simply footing the bill, nor is it 
acting as would a private insurance company, negotiating the best price 
available for its beneficiaries. Instead, a state that occupies the oversight role 
is using its vast state apparatus to make sure the prices that are being set are 
reasonable. 
The state is not setting prices directly, nor declaring certain prices 
illegal. Rather, a state occupying the oversight role is serving in a citizen-
protective role. One could liken the state’s role as overseer to its role occupied 
when regulating the price of public utilities within the state.220 In that role, 
the state is influencing the price of utilities in an effort to protect its citizens 
while refraining from resorting to prosecution for actors who charge too 
much; similarly here, the state uses its ability to protect citizens from high 
drug prices through its police power.221 This approach of protecting citizens 
rather than prosecuting violators is different from, although related to, the 
state adopting a consumer protection role.222 It is exemplified by the drug 
commission model, which is illustrated by new programs in Maryland and 
Maine. 
The Drug Commission Model. Just two years after passing an attention-
grabbing anti-gouging law that would have applied to nonessential, 
noncompetitive generic drugs223 had it not ultimately been struck down, the 
state of Maryland has now established a prescription drug affordability 
board. 224  The Maryland board is tasked with “evaluat[ing] the cost of 
particularly expensive medications, or those whose prices increase 
significantly.”225 If the board determines that the drug’s price is too high, “it 
would set an upper payment limit for that medication for people covered by 
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state or local health care plans other than Medicaid.” 226 It held its first 
meeting in January of 2020, with outreach meetings scheduled to be held in 
February.227 Pennsylvania additionally proposed a drug affordability board in 
early 2020.228 
Two additional details that relate to Maryland’s program are important: 
first, the program could be expanded to “limit[] . . . all drug purchases in the 
state,” and second, it could impact as many as 300,000 people.229 It only 
applies to drugs with a starting price at $30,000 per year, a brand-name drug 
that experiences a $3,000 increase, or a generic drug that experiences a price 
increase of more than 200 percent.230 Its first impactful work could go into 
effect in 2022 at the earliest.231 
Maine has also established a drug affordability board.232 This program 
will create a 5-member board tasked with creating “prescription drug spending 
targets for public entities based on a 10-year rolling average, accounting for 
inflation with spending reductions, and [will] provide methods for achieving 
lower prescription costs through measures such as bulk purchasing, leveraging 
multi-state purchasing, or negotiating specific rebate amounts.” 233  The 
legislation requires that the board be empaneled in 2020,234 and tasks the 
entity with devising plans and suggestions that would achieve cost savings for 
the state’s public payers.235 These plans could lead to an upper payment limit 
that would be set starting in 2022.236 
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* * * 
The solution of the drug commission board appears promising but is 
untested to this point by courts. Indeed, the new legislation has been 
influenced by Maryland’s past efforts to regulate drug prices.237 Those efforts 
ended in the Fourth Circuit striking down Maryland’s law,238 which is the 
focus of the next section. 
5.  State as Regulator 
Finally, the state can occupy the state-as-regulator role, in which the 
state emboldens and unleashes its most powerful arm—that of prosecutorial 
legal enforcement—to punish pharmaceutical companies for charging too 
much for their prescription drugs. While a handful of states were considering 
passing anti-gouging legislation by the summer of 2019,239 Maryland—and its 
controversial and ultimately struck-down law that was passed in 2017—is the 
prototypical example of a state that has empowered law enforcement to 
prosecute and punish pharmaceutical companies that have allegedly gouged its 
citizens for the price of prescription drugs. The story of Maryland is 
summarized below. 
Anti-Gouging Legislation. In 2017, and without the governor’s signature,240 
Maryland passed an anti-gouging law—legislation that applied to “essential 
off-patent or generic drug[s].”241 This law prevented those who are engaged in 
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drugs that were “made available for sale in” Maryland, the law authorized the 
Maryland attorney general to sue manufacturers where a manufacturer 
committed an unconscionable increase in the price of a drug.243 Under the law, 
the attorney general was empowered to prevent the price hike and freeze the 
original price, disgorge any profits, and seek civil penalties of up to $10,000.244 
Before doing so, however, the attorney general was required to “afford the 
manufacturer or distributor an opportunity to explain the basis of a price 
increase.”245 
Further, the statute did not define what type of price increase would 
constitute price gouging but did require the attorney general to show that the 
price increase was unconscionable and unjustified. 246  It also defined an 
“unconscionable increase” as an increase resulting in “consumers for whom the 
drug has been prescribed having no meaningful choice about whether to 
purchase the drug at an excessive price because of (1) the importance of the 
drug to their health, and (2) insufficient competition in the market for the 
drug.”247 Finally, “the attorney general was required to be notified of drug 
price increases of 50 percent or more ‘in a given year for drugs that cost[] 
more than $80 per 30-day course.’”248 The law went into effect in October of 
2017,249 but was declared unconstitutional by the Fourth Circuit in the spring 
of 2018.250 A request for a rehearing en banc was rejected in the summer of 
2018.251 More on its unconstitutionality follows below.252 
II.  REGULATORY CLOGS 
To date, four legal and administrative barriers have been erected to 
prevent states from regulating the price of prescription drugs. Their sources 
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vary. And the depths of these regulatory clogs make state efforts to 
successfully bring down the price of drugs all the more challenging; legislators 
must successfully navigate a thicket of overlapping laws with substantial 
preemptive power. 
Interestingly, as opposed to a scenario in which the federal government 
explicitly seeks to limit state power in a regulatory space, none of these four 
legal regimes serves as an affirmative limitation. Thus, none of the regimes 
directs specific limitations on state pharmaceutical price regulation per se. In 
other words, none of these four regimes were created to reserve the power to 
regulate the prices of pharmaceutical drugs to the federal government. 
Instead, the resultant regulatory void—the states’ inabilities to regulate 
pharmaceutical-drug prices—has been the result of a cumulative preemptive 
effect. For example, where one administrative agency process has blocked one 
pathway, another federal statute has blocked another avenue, with 
constitutional doctrine blocking yet another. To date, (1) ERISA, (2) the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, (3) CMS’s federal waiver process, and (4) 
federal patent preemption have been used to limit state efforts in this space. 
All four are summarized below. 
A. ERISA 
First, there is the Employee Retirement Insurance Security Act of 1974 
(“ERISA”),253 which constitutes the most serious legislative threat to state 
action.254 Most basically, ERISA prevents and invalidates state action that 
improperly “relates to” an employment-based private health insurance plan 
because the regulation of employee benefit plans is solely within the power of 
Congress.255 In effect, ERISA creates a system of complete preemption in 
which the federal statute overpowers application of any state law that 
constitutes an impermissible connection with employer-based health 
insurance.256 Work on ERISA’s massive preemption effect—and the long, 
dark shadow it casts on health care policy solutions—has been the subject of 
incisive scholarly attention and is not the focus of this analysis.257 Instead, this 
Article looks to the impediments that ERISA places before state regulation on 
prescription drug prices. 
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ERISA has an undeniable impact on state efforts to regulate prescription 
drug prices, primarily because in seeking to regulate drug prices states 
promulgate laws that impact the cost sharing of private employer-based health 
insurance plans, particularly self-funded insurance plans. 258  When states 
interfere with the prices that can be charged to insurance companies by drug 
companies, ERISA is likely to be activated to block the state efforts. Indeed, 
states have even run afoul of ERISA’s preemption provisions by passing laws 
that have simply required price reporting to a state agency.259 Thus, a state 
plan that impacts all payers in a state—for instance, a newly-proposed single-
payer plan that limits the costs of all prescription drugs—is likely to 
impermissibly implicate ERISA because those state laws impact types of 
insurance plans that are always regulated by ERISA.260 In this way, and with 
such a strong view of ERISA preemption, a state’s options at holistically 
limiting prescription drug prices—at least as those regulations operate on 
health insurance—seem limited. 
This is largely due to the fact that ERISA preempts “‘any and all’ state 
laws that ‘relate to’ employee benefit plans.”261 This provision mandates broad 
preemptive authority, constituting a much stronger impact than so-called floor 
preemption—the type of preemption that sets a federal floor and preempts 
weaker state regulation but allows states to regulate in a more rigorous way.262 
Because ERISA’s preemptive effect is so powerful, perhaps the only way 
around the preemption provision besides amending ERISA is to make 
compliance with state rules that regulate pharmaceutical-drug prices 
voluntary.263 
For this compelling reason, ERISA remains a block on the states’ ability 
to regulate the cost of prescription drugs. Indeed, more than sixty percent of 
Americans with employer-based insurance are covered by self-funded plans 
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that are governed directly by ERISA.264 Because of this concern, many state 
solutions are limited to devising answers to the challenges faced only by public 
payers in the state, most namely Medicaid.265 
However, any solution only addressing the price of prescription drugs 
paid for by state Medicaid programs would be incomplete; California, a state 
with a large Medicaid population, still only covers one-third of state residents 
through its Medicaid program. 266  Further, about twenty percent of 
Tennesseans are on the state Medicaid program of TennCare.267 Using state 
law to limit prices paid by Medicaid programs is unlikely to harm state cost 
control efforts but also seems unlikely to impact the overall list prices of 
prescription drugs. 
B. The Dormant Commerce Clause 
A court-made doctrine,268 the Dormant Commerce Clause presents an 
additional challenge to states seeking to regulate the price of drugs; states that 
seek to limit the price of drugs must be particularly cognizant of the 
extraterritoriality doctrine within it.269 State laws that seek to regulate drug 
costs that implicate transactions occurring outside of their state borders have 
been held to violate the Dormant Commerce Clause, largely because the 
doctrine prevents states from passing laws that evince an intent to regulate 
transactions in other states.270 
The most prominent use of the Dormant Commerce Clause to strike 
down a state’s effort is related to Maryland’s effort in establishing its anti-
gouging law.271 In the Fourth Circuit’s 2018 decision, the court noted that the 
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Maryland law did not sufficiently limit its reach to sales that occurred wholly 
within Maryland.272 Instead, the court concluded that the plain language of 
the Act—that the types of transactions that were under the purview of the Act 
applied to any “[e]ssential off-patent or generic drug” that was “made 
available for sale in [Maryland]”273—swept too far because the language was 
not limited to “sales that actually occur[red] within Maryland, nor [did] it 
restrict the Act’s operation to the context of a resale transaction with a 
Maryland consumer.” 274 On the narrow question of whether the specific 
language of the act appropriately limited the types of transactions over which 
it had an impact, the Fourth Circuit held that the language was insufficiently 
limited for purposes of dormant commerce analysis. 
That holding would suggest that a new, more narrowly-tailored effort 
(like one that limits its application to sales made in Maryland to Maryland 
consumers, for instance), could pass constitutional muster, but the Fourth 
Circuit was sure to block additional regulatory pathways for future state 
efforts.275 The court reasoned that “[e]ven if the Act did require a nexus to an 
actual sale in Maryland, it is nonetheless invalid because it still controls the 
price of transactions that occur wholly outside the state.”276 Because the law 
targeted manufacturers or wholesale distributors, and not “retailers that sell 
the drug directly to the consumer” and the price of the drug during “the initial 
sale of the drug,” the court concluded that the Act targeted “upstream pricing 
and sale of prescription drugs”—transactions that occur outside of the state.277 
Even though the First Circuit upheld a similar statute that did not directly 
regulate out of state transactions involving manufacturers, and even though 
the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that Maryland’s effort did “not establish a 
price schedule for prescription drugs, nor d[id] it aim to tie the prices charged 
for prescription drugs in Maryland to the prices at which those drugs are sold 
in other states,” the law “attempt[ed] to dictate the price that may be charged 
elsewhere for a good.”278 This, the court noted, it could not do.279 
The court went even further, calling the Maryland law a “price control” 
as opposed to an “upstream pricing impact,” the latter of which is typically 
upheld under a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge.280 Interestingly, the 
court differentiated previous scenarios from the Maryland law in an attempt 
to make the argument “that it ‘regulate[d] the price of [an] out-of-state 
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transaction.’” 281 Finally, the court found that the act burdened interstate 
commerce because of the thorny problem of a second state establishing similar 
regulation. The court noted that “[i]f multiple states enacted this type of 
legislation, then a manufacturer may consummate a transaction in a state 
where the transaction is fully permissible, yet still be subject to an 
enforcement action in another state (such as Maryland) wholly unrelated to 
the transaction.”282 The Fourth Circuit’s decision has illustrated the difficulty 
that states face when trying to regulate the price of drugs. 
C. Medicaid Waiver Requests 
Faced with ERISA and Dormant Commerce Clause challenges, it makes 
sense that states have fallen back on one area of health law and policy over 
which they (presumably) have tremendous discretion. Typically seen as an 
area of protected state innovation and dominion, states try to impact the price 
of prescription drugs through their Medicaid programs.283 While regulatory 
solutions that focus solely on the state’s Medicaid population lack the holistic 
solution to the problem of drug pricing, they still could presumably impact 
the prices that are charged while also holding down state budgets for Medicaid 
programs in an era of tightening coffers. 
Nonetheless, CMS denied Massachusetts’ waiver request, which would 
have allowed the state to establish a formulary within its Medicaid program in 
order to build in more cost-effectiveness.284 Legal scholars have noted that any 
legal objections to the proposal seem to be pretextual and that perhaps CMS 
was waiting on congressional buy-in before approving such waivers.285 For its 
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Costs: Why Is the Administration So Nervous?, HEALTH AFFS.: HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (Apr. 5, 2018), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180404.93363/full/ [https://perma.cc/WCY5-
NAMZ] [hereinafter Bagley & Sachs, Massachusetts Wants To Drive Down Medicaid] (“Perhaps more 
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part, CMS noted that “it would have considered the waiver if it was a pilot or 
demonstration project,” but the Massachusetts application was not proposed 
as such a project. 286 Scholars sharply criticized the decision to deny the 
waiver,287 as CMS did not provide legal reasoning that explained the denial of 
the waiver.288 Instead, CMS suggested that states that sought such waivers 
could get them approved if they gave up Medicaid’s statutory discounts,289 but 
it is highly unlikely that any state would opt for such a pathway.290 Indeed, the 
Medicaid program provides statutory rebates, and most states achieve 
additional supplemental rebates with manufacturers.291 
As a result, CMS has blocked another avenue for states to address 
pharmaceutical-drug pricing while limiting state power in an area that has 
historically been seen as extensive. This has occurred while the federal 
administration encourages states to use the Medicaid waiver process to 
construct work requirements in the Medicaid program292 and to overhaul its 
 
plausible is the idea that CMS wants congressional buy-in before taking a step—approving closed 
formularies—that would undermine the legislative bargain struck between rebates and coverage.”). 
 286. Dickson, supra note 284. 
 287. See Katie Gudiksen, Update on Massachusetts’ Waiver Request To Use a Drug Formulary 
for   Medicaid, SOURCE (July 9, 2018), https://sourceonhealthcare.org/source-short-update-on-
massachusetts-waiver-request-to-use-a-drug-formulary-for-medicaid/ [https://perma.cc/JP78-8V9G] 
(“If the federal government is serious about increasing pharmaceutical competition, they need to 
allow states to test different methods of bringing down prices, including using closed formularies, to 
force drug manufacturers to demonstrate the value of their products to patients.”). 
 288. See Nicholas Bagley & Rachel E. Sachs, Limiting State Flexibility in Drug Pricing, 379 
NEW  ENG. J. MED. 1002, 1003 (2018), https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1809358 
[https://perma.cc/H745-4ZWT (dark archive)]. Bagley and Sachs further expand on CMS’s failure to 
expand on the denial of the waiver: 
For example, the agency could have said—but didn’t—that the waiver is bad policy. It could 
have said—but didn’t—that the waiver contravenes the purposes of the Medicaid statute. It 
could have said—but didn’t—that the agency lacks the resources to oversee a novel waiver 
like this one. CMS offered no explanation at all for the rejection . . . . From a legal 
perspective, that’s a problem. Administrative law requires agencies to provide reasons for 
their actions. 
Id. 
 289. See Rachel Sachs & Nicole Huberfeld, The Problematic Law and Policy of Medicaid Block 
Grants, HEALTH AFFS.: HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (July 24, 2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/ 
do/10.1377/hblog20190722.62519/full/ [https://perma.cc/DPE3-TY94] (“Although CMS did not 
explain the legal reasoning behind its denial, it did suggest that a state may choose to exclude drugs if 
it forgoes Medicaid’s statutory discounts. This strategy, though, is unlikely to lead to savings larger 
than the program was able to obtain already. Only if a state severely restricts the drugs it will cover, 
and therefore severely restricts patients’ access to care, could cost savings occur.”). 
 290. See Bagley & Sachs, Massachusetts Wants To Drive Down Medicaid, supra note 285 (noting 
that Massachusetts and Arizona are the only states that have requested waivers). 
 291. See Rachel Dolan, Understanding the Medicaid Prescription Drug Rebate Program, KAISER FAM. 
FOUND. (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/understanding-the-medicaid-
prescription-drug-rebate-program/ [https://perma.cc/A9JA-QFJM]. 
 292. Corin Cates-Carney, Rural Seasonal Workers Worry About Montana Medicaid’s Work 
Requirements, NPR (Nov. 3, 2019, 8:10 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/ 
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funding mechanism through block grant proposals, 293  which both face 
substantial legal hurdles.294 
D. Patent Law 
Finally, federal patent law can impact state efforts to regulate the pricing 
of pharmaceutical drugs.295 Pay-for-delay bills are meant to outlaw the practice 
of pharmaceutical companies with lucrative patents from paying potential 
competitors to delay entry of alternative drugs into the market.296 This is a 
prominent argument in the litigation surrounding California Bill AB 824,297 
which bans “pay-for-delay” deals.298 The Association for Accessible Medicines 
(“AAM”), the plaintiff in the Maryland litigation, sued the state of California 
seeking a preliminary injunction and alleging a number of legal infirmities.299 
In that motion, which was denied on December 31, 2019,300 AAM made a 
 
2019/11/03/766115339/rural-seasonal-workers-worry-about-montana-medicaids-work-requirements 
[https://perma.cc/RME3-HRQU] (“The Trump administration . . . encourages states to add work 
requirements to Medicaid . . . .”). Medicaid work requirement proposals, which seek to limit the 
population covered by the Medicaid program, have been the subject of extensive litigation. While 
approved by CMS, to date, waiver requests have been blocked by federal courts as violative of the 
Medicaid statute. See, e.g., Stewart v. Azar, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125, 145–48 (D.D.C. 2019), appeal filed, 
Stewart v. Azar, No. 19-5097 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 11, 2019). 
 293. See Nathaniel Weixel, Trump Administration To Allow Medicaid Block Grants, HILL (Jan. 30, 
2020, 9:38 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/480650-trump-administration-to-allow-
medicaid-block-grants [https://perma.cc/AQ3L-FLYK]. 
 294. See, e.g., Stewart, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 145–48; Shira Stein, Medicaid Block Grant Policy Could 
Face High Legal Hurdles, BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 28, 2020, 5:16 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ 
health-law-and-business/medicaid-block-grant-policy-could-face-high-legal-hurdles [https://perma.cc/ 
6XSW-YMYY]. 
 295. But see Serena Lipski, Excessive Pricing and Pharmaceuticals: Why the Federal Patent Act Does 
Not Preempt State Regulation of Pharmaceutical Prices, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 913, 914 (2008) (“Any 
implication that a state is prohibited from regulating pharmaceutical pricing at all, however, 
challenges core principles of federalism and the special role of the state as the primary source of laws 
promoting health and welfare. A state may directly regulate the price of pharmaceutical products, 
patented or not, as part of its general police power.”). 
 296. See Michael Owens, A Cure for Collusive Settlements: The Case for a Per Se Prohibition on Pay-
for-Delay Agreements in Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 78 MO. L. REV. 1353, 1353 (2013) (“Under a 
pay-for-delay agreement, a manufacturer of a brand-name pharmaceutical will settle patent 
infringement litigation by making payments to a defendant generic manufacturer in exchange for the 
generic manufacturer refraining from entering the market.”). 
 297. Act of Oct. 7, 2019, 2019 Cal. Stat. ch. 531 (A.B. 824) (codified at CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE §§ 134000–134002) (Westlaw current with urgency legislation through Ch. 372 of 
2020 Reg. Sess.)). 
 298. See Phebe Hong, Legal Challenges to California’s Pay-for-Delay Ban, BILL HEALTH (Oct. 
17, 2019), https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2019/10/17/legal-challenges-to-californias-pay-for-
delay-ban/ [https://perma.cc/TWP4-4X24] (“The AAM argues that the California law is 
unconstitutional because it regulates out-of-state transactions and is preempted by federal patent 
law.”). 
 299. See Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. Becerra, No. 2:19-cv-02281, 2019 WL 7370421, at *1–2 
(E.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2019), vacated and remanded, 822 F. App’x 532 (9th Cir. July 24, 2020). 
 300. Id. at *1. 
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number of legal arguments, one of which focused on the fact that California’s 
law that banned pay-for-delay deals between pharmaceutical companies was 
preempted by federal patent law.301 
In that case, the Eastern District of California agreed with the state that 
California’s pay-for-delay law did not violate federal patent preemption 
because it did “not require determination of the validity of a patent and [did] 
not create patent-like protections.”302 The court also denied the argument that 
the law violated the Hatch-Waxman Act,303 largely because the court found it 
“impossible to know if this law will have its intended effect, or as Plaintiff 
argue[d], will backfire, causing generic companies to cease filing [abbreviated 
new drug (“ANDA”)] applications304 and challenging patents held by brand-
name drug companies.”305 Finally, the court denied a challenge related to the 
well-known case of FTC v. Actavis,306 noting that “Actavis turns on questions 
of antitrust law, not patent law, and federal antitrust law does not preempt 
state antitrust law.”307 Nonetheless, states cannot specifically target patented 
pharmaceuticals, as that effort has been struck down before.308  
Although the district court’s decision was struck down by the Ninth 
Circuit exclusively due to issues with standing, and California’s efforts to 
activate its pay-for-delay law are left unresolved, patent preemption remains a 
powerful tool that is intended to keep states from intervening in this space. 
Indeed, courts have routinely invalidated state efforts that have impermissibly 
conflicted with federal patent law.309 A state law that governs the marketing, 
selling, and competition of a patented good—in this case, a pharmaceutical 
drug—has to contend with the concern that it will run afoul of patent 
preemption here. 
 
 301. Id. at *7. 
 302. See id. 
 303. Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 35 
U.S.C. § 156). 
 304. An ANDA application is an “abbreviated new drug application,” which is the application 
filed for a generic drug. See Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 
(May 22, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/types-applications/abbreviated-new-drug-application-
anda [https://perma.cc/APK5-MR9L]. “Generic drug applications are termed ‘abbreviated’ because 
they are generally not required to include preclinical (animal) and clinical (human) data to establish 
safety and effectiveness.” Id. 
 305. Ass’n for Accessible Meds., 2019 WL 7370421, at *7 
 306. 570 U.S. 136 (2013). 
 307. See Ass’n for Accessible Meds., 2019 WL 7370421, at *8. 
 308. See, e.g., Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362, 1371–74 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007). 
 309. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152–57 (1989) 
(“[S]tate regulation of intellectual property must yield to the extent that it clashes with the balance 
struck by Congress in our patent laws.”); Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., 182 F.3d 1340, 1355 
(Fed. Cir. 1999). 
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* * * 
After canvassing the states’ efforts and the formidable legal hurdles, 
Table 1 categorizes those observations. It also provides an assessment of the 
likelihood of success as well as notable drawbacks given the strength of the 
obstruction of particular regulatory strategies that states face. 
What is notable about the various approaches, and their particular legal 
and policy-based risks, is that those in which the state appears to be engaging 
in the most effective interventions are most hamstrung by legal challenges. 
Efforts most free from legal challenge appear to be those that are either 
likelier to be ineffective or a partial solution to the drug-pricing problem. For 
example, the constitutionality of transparency laws does not appear to be in 
doubt, but the effectiveness of those laws is surely questionable. Subscription 
models appear to trigger no legal challenge, but they only deal (as currently 
constituted) with one drug for the Medicaid population. Worse, prescription 
drug caps and other efforts that narrow access are clearly protected within the 
state’s police power but have negative impacts on population health. 
Maryland’s effort—which empowered the state to bring the force of its power 
to bear to lower drug costs—was blocked by the Dormant Commerce Clause. 
These observations highlight the challenges facing states and the unenviable 
task of achieving regulatory success and meaningful improvement without 
drawing a substantial legal challenge. 
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Table 1: State Roles and Efforts To Impact Drug Pricing 
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III.  THE PROBLEMS OF CUMULATIVE DRUG-PRICING PREEMPTION 
Besides the concerns related to the balance of health care federalism—
which is beyond the purview of this Article—the inability of states to regulate 
the price of pharmaceutical drugs raises two different species of concerns. The 
two species are encapsulated by (1) the legitimacy of the regulatory scheme, 
and (2) any normative values that are surfaced by this type of regulatory 
regime. 
 
 310. With the exception of injunctions against work requirements, like those seen in Kentucky. 
Other efforts that limit access to drugs for a state’s Medicaid population do not face legal threats. 
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The first concern focuses on regulatory legitimacy. Indeed, eviscerating 
state power to regulate pharmaceutical-drug prices when the federal 
government has no forthcoming solution to the crisis—for example, blocking 
state efforts, whether by courts or a federal agency with no superseding 
federal solution—abdicates important congressional duties that would be 
responsive to concerns of the populace. More seriously, it raises important 
questions about whether those regulatory clogs are appropriate or whether 
they illustrate an illegitimate block on state power. Concerns referenced in 
other scholarly literature—particularly the concerns raised by “null” 
preemption from Professor Jonathan Remy Nash 311 —are worthwhile to 
consider in the context of pharmaceutical-drug pricing regulation as 
considered here. These concerns are made all the more important given the 
efforts by the drug-pricing industry to use preemption to block regulatory 
efforts and, correspondingly, a friendly U.S. Supreme Court.312 This both 
raises the stakes over these fights and further incentivizes business interests to 
increasingly rely on the power of preemption. 
The second species of concerns focuses on four normative interests raised 
by the impotency of states in this area. First, states’ inabilities to regulate and 
answer to their citizens’ demands raises antidemocratic concerns. Second, the 
elimination of state regulation makes the regulatory regime weaker. Third, 
and perhaps counterintuitively (to the extent state experimentation leads to 
diverse policy prescriptions), states’ inability to regulate drug prices may lead 
to a less efficient and less consistent regulatory design over time. Fourth, there 
is a practical concern; the federal block seems to make it less likely that the 
crisis—evinced by the observation that prescription drugs cost too much for 
too many Americans—will actually be addressed. For these arguments, 
literature from administrative and environmental law scholarship—specifically 
from Professor William Buzbee—will be applied to the pharmaceutical-
pricing challenge in an effort to show why the federal cap on state 
policymaking in this space is not only concerning but also damaging. 
A. Regulatory Legitimacy and Null Preemption 
In his 2010 law review article, Professor Jonathan Remy Nash observes 
and defines “null preemption,” the phenomenon that occurs when the federal 
 
 311. See generally Jonathan Remy Nash, Null Preemption, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1015 (2010) 
(explaining null preemption and the concerns it raises). 
 312. See Sandra Zellmer, Preemption by Stealth, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1659, 1703 (2009) (“As the 
states become more aggressive in filling gaps left by lax federal regulatory schemes and federal 
enforcement failures, for-profit corporations, developers, and other antiregulatory forces have become 
equally aggressive—and quite effective—in wielding preemption as an obstacle to the 
implementation of protective state regulations.”). 
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government preempts state law but replaces it with nothing.313 Ultimately 
arguing that the practice should be limited and that courts should “react 
skeptically to assertions of null preemption,” Professor Nash provides a 
nomenclature for the practice throughout his piece.314 That nomenclature—
although specifically focused on environmental law—can be borrowed and 
imported into health law scholarship, particularly within the regulation of 
pharmaceutical-drug prices, to illuminate some startling findings. 
At the center of Professor Nash’s work is a concern about the legitimacy 
of a federal government that preempts all state action but replaces it with no 
concomitant federal regulation.315 The legitimacy-based concerns raised by 
null preemption are likely to exacerbate the concerns he identifies as generally 
common to preemption, not the least of which is the harm to state dignity 
caused by preemption in these cases.316 As he argues, and as is seen in the 
pharmaceutical drug context, a federal regime intent on blocking state efforts 
but unwilling to establish a superseding regulatory structure raises all the 
legitimacy concerns seen in occurrences of null preemption. 
B. Normative Concerns 
In his piece, Federalism Hedging, Entrenchment, and the Climate Challenge, 
Professor William W. Buzbee presents a compelling argument that supports 
state regulation in environmental law.317 Although his expert focus is on 
environmental regulation with a specific emphasis on climate change, 
Professor Buzbee’s insights and lessons can be easily translated and applied to 
health law and to the pharmaceutical-drug-cost crisis. Specifically, his 
 
 313. See Nash, supra note 311, at 1017. 
 314. Id. at 1016. 
 315. Id. at 1055–56. 
  The legitimacy costs of null preemption to state governments are substantial. Federal 
preemption of state law is inconsistent with the dignity of states as sovereigns in any 
circumstance. The offense is of lesser magnitude where, under the constitutional scheme for 
allocation of power, the preemption lies in an area in which the federal government is seen 
to regulate more effectively or appropriately. In contrast, the offense to state dignity is 
surely heightened where the preemption is null preemption, and the federal government 
preempts state power to regulate without offering to do so on its own. 
Id. at 1055. 
 
 316. See id. at 1055 (“Federal preemption of state law is inconsistent with the dignity of states as 
sovereigns in any circumstance.” (citing Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in 
Search of a Theory, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1011, 1040–41 (2000))); see also Nina A. Mendelson, 
Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 781 (2004) (observing that regulatory preemption 
of state law could “impose upon a state’s dignity or a state’s function as a policy ‘laboratory’ or center 
of democratic activity”). 
 317. See generally William W. Buzbee, Federalism Hedging, Entrenchment, and the Climate 
Challenge, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 1037 (arguing the need for both state and federal regulation of climate 
change). 
99 N.C. L. REV. 167 (2020) 
2020] THE DRUG (PRICING) WARS 215 
observations—and particularly those about the strength and consistency of a 
state-based regulatory framework—can be applied to the instant analysis and 
are highlighted below. 
The imposition of various legal rules that have blocked state efforts to 
successfully regulate prescription drugs has led to four normative concerns 
about cumulative preemption: it (1) is antidemocratic, (2) weakens the 
strength of the regulatory regime overall, (3) injects inconsistency into the 
regulatory environment, and (4) decreases the changes of a durable and 
successful federal intervention. These four challenges—presented as four 
adjectives that highlight normative concerns with this type of regulatory 
regime—are presented in-depth below. 
1.  Antidemocratic 
First, the most apparent concern evinced by the federal block on state 
regulation of drug prices is the impact of federal action on blocking the will of 
citizens. State action, which includes attempting to impose Medicaid 
formularies to gain more control over the cost of prescription drugs, passing 
new anti-gouging laws that give the state the ability to more powerfully 
regulate and prevent radical price increases, and allowing the state access to 
prescription drug-pricing data—are all undertaken in response to pressure 
from the citizenry.318 Federal actions that block a state’s ability to regulate in 
this space silence the voices of the citizens and “entirely deprive[] states of 
their ability to fulfill their sovereign obligation to protect their citizens.”319 
This concern may be particularly pronounced when executive agencies and/or 
federal appellate courts are the sources of the antidemocratic actions. 
Indeed, there are few issues featuring as much consensus among 
Americans. Nearly ten years after the passage of the ACA, citizens believe 
drug costs are too high.320 This is a topic of broad agreement across the 
political spectrum.321 A striking percentage of Americans skip taking doses of 
 
 318. See Mendelson, supra note 316, at 781 (referring to the state as a “center of democratic 
activity”). 
 319. See Nash, supra note 311, at 1055. 
 320. See Jay Hancock, Americans Ready To Crack Down on Drug Prices That Force Some To Skip 
Doses, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Mar. 1, 2019), https://khn.org/news/americans-ready-to-crack-down-
on-drug-prices-that-force-some-to-skip-doses/ [https://perma.cc/9KRR-QMXP] (“By a 9-to-1 ratio, 
Republicans, Democrats and independents favor making drug companies show list prices in their 
advertising . . . .”); Ed Silverman, Most Americans Believe Prescription Drug Prices Are Unreasonable, 
STAT NEWS (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016/09/29/americans-believe-
drug-prices-unreasonable/ [https://perma.cc/8ZDW-S7PE] (noting that about 80% of Americans call 
prescription drug prices “unreasonable”). 
 321. See Poll: Majorities of Democrats, Republicans and Independents Support Actions To Lower Drug 
Costs, Including Allowing Americans To Buy Drugs from Canada, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (May 1, 2017), 
https://www.kff.org/health-costs/press-release/poll-majorities-of-democrats-republicans-and-
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medication in an effort to save money. 322 Consequently, wide majorities 
support additional efforts to improve access to medicines.323 Of those polled, 
sixty-three percent stated that “there’s not as much regulation as there should 
be to help limit the price of prescription drugs.”324 Nearly ninety percent of 
respondents supported government negotiations for the Medicare program, 
and eighty percent stated that Americans should be allowed to import drugs 
from Canada.325 It is clear that the cap on state efforts, preventing them from 
adequately regulating pharmaceutical drugs, frustrates clear wishes of a vast 
majority of the citizenry. 
2.  Weaker 
Overlapping regulation—between the federal and state levels—makes 
the regulatory structure stronger because it bolsters deterrence and forces the 
desired improvement by enforcing those regulations.326 Put simply, it is more 
likely that two regulatory entities will uncover and punish illegality. 327 
Overlapping regulation also achieves a level of redundancy in the regulatory 
structure, working to operationalize the fact that “another regulatory system 
reduces the possibility that certain undesirable behavior slips through the 
cracks.”328 
State and federal regulatory authorities also allow learning of best 
practices to occur. 329  Both horizontal and vertical feedback take place, 
improving the chance that the regulatory regimes can learn from one another. 
Federal intervention in this way, specifically intervention that blocks state 
efforts, can “short-circuit the evolution and spread of regulatory ideas.”330 Not 
only does it block states from trying out different regulatory solutions for 
eventual federal implementation, but it chills the learning that occurs between 




 322. See Fuse Brown & Sarpatwari, supra note 264, at 6 (noting that twenty percent of 
Americans have skipped or delayed a pharmaceutical dosage due to cost). 
 323. See Alison Kodjak, Poll: Americans Support Government Action To Curb Prescription Drug Prices, 
NPR (Mar. 1, 2019, 3:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/03/01/699086303/ 
poll-americans-support-government-action-to-curb-prescription-drug-prices [https://perma.cc/X8BQ 
-ZXYY] (providing poll data suggesting respondents majorly favor proposals to lower drug costs). 
 324. Id. 
 325. See id. 
 326. See Buzbee, supra note 317, at 1050. 
 327. Id.; see also ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE 
PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 123–24, 154 (2009). 
 328. See Nash, supra note 311, at 1057. 
 329. See Buzbee, supra note 317, at 1050–51. 
 330. See Nash, supra note 311, at 1056–57. 
 331. See Jonathan H. Adler, Interstate Competition and the Race to the Top, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 89, 97 (2012) (“To the contrary, evidence suggests, at least in those areas not dominated by 
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3.  Inconsistent 
Striking down state efforts injects additional inconsistency into the 
regulatory regime. Consistency is important for the obvious reason of securing 
the stability of an interlocking federal regulatory state but also—as Professor 
Buzbee recognizes—for bringing other strengths to the regulatory 
environment. All can be applied to the pharmaceutical-drug-cost crisis. 
First, Professor Buzbee notes that “regulatory success and stability will 
often depend on market and business innovations that over time will make 
regulatory burdens palatable.”332 In other words, new regulatory requirements 
often spur innovative actors who flock to a market in an effort to assist the 
targets of regulation in dealing with the newly created regulatory space. To 
apply this recognition to the instant analysis, this would suggest that increased 
state regulation of pharmaceutical-drug pricing would incentivize new 
innovators to create products that would enable drug companies to better 
handle new regulatory burdens. These may be companies that can handle the 
monitoring and compliance functions that would accompany any drug-pricing 
regulatory regime required by a state. 
Second, and relatedly, once a regulatory regime takes hold, business 
interests are incentivized “to become political coalitions that oppose 
regulatory change that could unsettle their markets.” 333  Once a state is 
permitted to regulate in the space, business interests push targeted entities to 
reshuffle their incentives so as to increasingly concretize the rising regulatory 
requirements, instantiating them within a business model and industry.334 As 
is argued in the context of climate change, “businesses . . . have, over time, 
become increasingly invested in the new status quo and will defend it.”335 
Indeed, with no state regulation, the regulatory structure is wholly 
dependent on federal regulation, which can be fickle based on changes in 
presidential administration. As Professor Buzbee notes, overlapping state and 
federal regulation creates a sort of regulatory insurance. In this way, “federal 
regulatory instability or reversal will not result in the collapse of 
interdependent markets and businesses” and “[n]o single jurisdiction’s 
regulatory reversals or instability will destroy the market or product category 
demand.”336 This is the fundamental value of consistency in a regulatory 
 
federal intervention, that states learn from each other and move toward adopting superior 
environmental policies because of interactions with their neighbors.”); Vicki C. Jackson, Thayer, 
Holmes, Brandeis: Conceptions of Judicial Review, Factfinding, and Proportionality, 130 HARV. L. REV. 
2348, 2354–55 (2017) (observing that Justice Brandeis supported American federalism, which allows 
states to learn from one another). 
 332. Buzbee, supra note 317, at 1052. 
 333. Id. at 1053–54. 
 334. Id. 
 335. Id. at 1096. 
 336. Id. at 1056. 
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regime that allows both federal and state intervention. The “stops and starts” 
experienced in the effort to regulate drug prices have added to the 
inconsistency in this space. 
4.  Decreasing the Chance of Federal Intervention 
Relatedly, state-based regulation is likely to increase the chance of 
successful federal intervention. In the first way, state regulation reduces the 
temperature of regulatory fight, making it less of a zero-sum battle between 
the industry and policymakers. Second, simply allowing states to regulate in 
this space—and, in some ways, irrespective of the regulatory success they 
ultimately experience—serves a communicative function to federal regulators, 
increasing pressure on them to act. 
First, allowing states to regulate drug prices would defang the 
pharmaceutical industry’s efforts to fight every attempt by the federal 
government with such vigor. As Professor Buzbee mentions, “[t]he rewards 
for fighting regulation will diminish if success leaves another layer of 
regulation, especially if that layer is made up of disparate state policies.”337 
Indeed, because states are often prevented from regulating drug prices from 
the start, business interests face supercharged incentives to fight every federal 
effort, largely because the federal policy battle represents the whole ball 
game.338 
A related observation is also worth mentioning. In addition to simply 
refraining from fighting holistic regulation, the existence of state regulation in 
the space may actually pressure industry actors to “come to the table” in 
search of a better federal solution. As Professor Buzbee mentions, “the mere 
possibility of more varied and possibly more onerous state regulation can 
reduce the risk of such federal policy reversal or even catalyze calls for federal 
regulation.”339 It may even be the case that the industry supports a federal law 
that improves on a state law that may be flawed. 340  Indeed, successful 
implementation of state regulation may not even be necessary, but the ability 
of states to regulate in the space is important. As noted, the threat of state 
regulation “creates incentives for greater commitment to the successful 
implementation of a federal law” by the industry.341 A regulatory structure 
that robs the states of any potential ability to regulate eviscerates this positive 
effect. 
 
 337. Id. at 1057. 
 338. See id. at 1098 (“In fact, the regulatory payoff for regulatory obstruction at the federal level 
would be greater if that derailment promised a complete escape from regulation.”). 
 339. Id. at 1056–57. 
 340. See id. at 1096. 
 341. See id. at 1099. 
99 N.C. L. REV. 167 (2020) 
2020] THE DRUG (PRICING) WARS 219 
Finally, allowing the state to operate in the space may increase the 
chance of federal intervention—not only because allowing states to operate 
further encourages businesses to come to the negotiating table, but it also 
raises pressure on federal actors. In the face of state action, the costs of federal 
regulators not acting become greater. State action ratchets up political 
pressure on the federal government. It also serves as a viable channel, allowing 
and protecting the value of expression.342 
In this vein, and as Professor Patti Zettler has noted in the context of 
FDA approval,343 state action serves not just as a substantive exercise but also 
constitutes a communicative action. Indeed, state action here is important not 
just for whether it ultimately works—or, for the confines of this Article, is ever 
allowed to potentially work—but state action is important because of its 
communicative signal to the federal government.344 In other words, states 
operating in this space create pressure on the federal government to act—
pressure that mounts following an increasing number of state actions to bring 
down the price of prescription drugs. A system that frequently holds that 
states lack the power to regulate drug prices allows federal policymakers to 
hide in their inaction and delay any meaningful intervention. This argument 
would suggest that states that ultimately are unsuccessful in bringing down 
the cost of prescription drugs are still serving an important function by 
signaling to the federal government that this is a problem in need of a 
solution. But without durable state solutions, that important communicative 
function is silenced. 
C. Alternative Pathways 
Given the challenges that exist, it is worthwhile to contemplate particular 
regulatory channels and initiatives that still provide a potential way forward 
for states to regulate the price of prescription drugs. These potentials, 
currently unblocked, feature a cognizable argument as to which regulatory 
avenues are clearly within the state’s power to establish. They are (1) 
professional regulation, (2) consumer protection, and (3) voluntary or softer-
power regimes. All three are explored below. 
Professional Regulation. In other areas within health law, states have 
unfettered discretion to regulate the practice of medicine. Indeed, states have 
plenary authority to govern licensing and disciplinary actions within their 
borders.345 Through the use of their police power, states also have the ability 
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to regulate different facets of the practice of medicine, and can regulate how 
many and what pills they allow providers to prescribe.346 It is conceivable that 
a state regulation that limits the types of drugs that the provider can prescribe, 
though impeding clinical discretion, could be used by states to prevent 
physicians from prescribing drugs that are too expensive. 
Price Gouging Laws Focused on Consumer Protection and Lending Law. As 
Professors Becky Wolitz and Michelle Mello have argued,347 states could 
deploy consumer protection statutes in a more robust way in an effort to 
protect citizens from unconscionable pricing while avoiding a void-for-
vagueness challenge. These laws, typically well within states’ domains, seek to 
impose externalities on manufacturers whose products harm citizens, much in 
the same way prescription drug prices harm those who are exposed to their 
high prices. Mello and Wolitz argue that lending laws offer a helpful analog 
but caution that “a state-level consumer protection law focused on generic 
drug prices is still risky.”348 
A Voluntary or Incentive-Based Solution. A third potential solution is to 
build a regulatory mechanism that is largely voluntary but which incentivizes 
participation. These systems would be free from the concerns over state 
regulation of the insurance marketplace but would seek to ratchet up pressure 
on prescription drug manufacturers who price their drugs at unsustainable 
levels. Different rewards, such as preferred tax status, could be awarded to 
prescription drug companies who act in a way the state wants to encourage. 
This would allow the state to avoid the challenges of ERISA, but it would face 
the challenge of being a regulatory solution that lacks any enforcement 
mechanism. 
CONCLUSION 
The prices of prescription drugs in the United States are unsustainable. 
Not only do they exact a painful cost on America’s consumers, but they impact 
Americans’ access to life-enhancing (and sometimes lifesaving) drugs. 
Recognizing this threat, states have attempted to regulate in this space to 
protect their citizens. States rely on multiple roles when it comes to 
prescription drug prices. Some act as payers, consumers, market facilitators, 
overseers, or regulators. Many occupy multiple roles simultaneously. 
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Increased state action in this space reflects a rising trend of state primacy 
in health policy. But action on the ground is hamstrung, with a number of 
legal blocks preventing various state solutions from taking effect. From 
ERISA, to the Dormant Commerce Clause, to HHS’s waiver process, federal 
sources of law serve as a cap on state action in this space. Besides the obvious 
harms, these regulatory clogs are antidemocratic, weaken the regulatory 
structure, inject inconsistencies, and are likely to lessen the chances of a 
satisfactory federal solution. This analysis suggests a rethinking of the current 
federally driven regulatory regime in an effort to finally make America’s 
prescription drugs affordable. 
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